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1.  Functioning states are necessary conditions of inclusion; and the major 
causes of exclusion. 
States matter more than societies in building inclusion. That is because they 
define societies, and their possibilities1. Impersonalized institutions that have 
some degree of centralized and procedurally governed political decision-making 
characterize functioning states. They have coercive capacities: they can regulate 
all instruments of potential public violence, and prevent or inhibit their own 
agents from being predators. They express authentic legal sovereignty over 
persons, property, and their movements, and are recognized as such entities by 
their citizens, civil society organizations, and by other states. Through self-help 
or alliances they can defend themselves against other states. Lastly, functioning 
states are defined by their recognized sovereignty over territory, and its 
accompanying prerogatives: control over entry and exit of persons and entities. If Brendan O'Leary  Page 2  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  2
states lack these capabilities they cannot protect elementary human rights, 
promote human development, or be inclusive in any meaningful sense.  
 
Conversely, failing and failed states are personalized: dominated by rulers – a 
family, clan or clique - who do not distinguish public and private realms. They 
become ‘kleptocracies’, governments of thieves, before or during their collapse. 
They lack coherent, institutionalized, rule-governed patterns of centralized 
decision-making that inhibit predation. They are predators. They lose their 
monopoly on the regulation of coercion, and are challenged by guerillas, 
paramilitaries, terrorists, Mafiosi; they may be invaded, looted, and occupied by 
other states. They neither make nor enforce law. Those over whom they have 
failed to rule despise them as much as they fear them. Functioning states pay lip-
service to failing states, avoiding their ‘officials’ if they can, invading ‘their’ lands 
if they deem it necessary.  
 
These properties of failed states should remind us that ‘inclusion’ is only possible 
within well-ordered states. ‘Inclusivity’ and human development require more 
than the diffusion of the right values; they need the soil of functioning states 
because they are unlikely to grow in ‘anarchia’. Order, to put it bluntly, is a 
necessary condition of inclusivity. Without it we have Thomas Hobbes’ condition 
of ‘Warre’:  ‘the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in 
awe…in which every man is Enemy to every man; …wherein men live without Brendan O'Leary  Page 3  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  3
other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall 
furnish them…In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit 
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; 
no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no 
Society; and which is worse of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; 
and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short’2. Hobbes was right 
to emphasize the necessity of order, but wrong to mandate an authoritarian 
solution. But we may still draw a lesson from his arguments: without a well-
ordered state there cannot be democracy, functioning markets, human 
development or inclusivity. 
 
Unlike Hobbes, we know that states may be lethal, more lethal than the ‘war of 
all against all’. States are the most powerful agencies of exclusion, governments 
the major killers in human history. Many state-builders and nation-builders have 
been, respectively,  people-killers and nation-killers. In the twentieth century 
Rudolf Rummel has calculated that governments killed nearly 170 million people 
within their borders, a figure that exceeds those killed in wars between states3. 
Genocide, killing people because of their presumed ascriptive characteristics, has 
been more common than most countries’ official histories acknowledge, and 
governments have been the major perpetrators -  and the list is not confined to Brendan O'Leary  Page 4  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  4
Ottoman Turkey, Nazi Germany, and Interahamwe Rwanda.  Politicide, killing 
those  deemed political opponents of regimes,   has been equally recurrent in 
modernity. The Soviet Union, especially under Stalin, was the major killer regime 
of the last century: nearly 62 million are estimated to have perished at its hands; 
Maoist  China was often  as brutal, killing over 35 million people.  Democide, the 
killing of peoples, is the ultimate form of exclusion, and governments its major 
perpetrators. Governments have also organized, encouraged,  or not stopped,  
the  expulsion of whole categories of persons from their land borders or  their 
shores – people whom they have helped to define  as undesirable, non-
indigenous, non-national, or disloyal.  The twentieth century can be described as 
the century of expulsion, of the ‘cleansing’ of populations, as much as one of 
genocide. Governments have also been the prime architects of policies of 
discriminatory control: organizing dominant national, ethnic, religious or 
communal groups, disorganizing and subordinating other national, ethnic, 
religious or cultural groups through policies of systematic discrimination, or 
exclusion.  
 
These should be commonplace thoughts. Regrettably,  they are not sufficiently 
appreciated. States define people’s life-chances, both  individually and 
collectively. And it is to their practices that we must look when considering how 
greater inclusion, as defined in this rep o r t  b y  A m a r t y a  S e n ,    m a y  b e s t  b e  
facilitated. Exclusion, in the regulation  of national, ethnic and religious Brendan O'Leary  Page 5  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  5
differences,   is  the product of coercive homogenization and of differential 
treatment, privileging communities:  counting some categories of persons and 
communities ‘in’, as members, and others ‘out’.  Genocide, expulsion and the 
imposed partition of territories are modes of homogenizing peoples that are now 
internationally outlawed, even if the relevant laws are frequently not enforced. If 
and  when  international norms against genocide and expulsion are rigorously 
enforced, through interventions ranging from diplomatic sanctions, economic 
sanctions, military embargos (or lifting of embargos), military occupations, and 
international criminalization of genocidal officials, then  the worst forms of 
exclusion may be halted or inhibited. Success in this endeavor requires both 
moral universalism – genocide and expulsion need  to be treated as criminally 
wrong everywhere – and a re-orientation of the foreign policies of the great 
powers, so that both their policy-makers and domestic constituencies see the 
prevention and punishment  of genocide and expulsion as in their interests4.  
 
The record of recent history is mixed: it need not occasion despair. Sanctions 
against exclusionary practices – against discriminatory racist, religiously 
intolerant and xenophobic regimes – had major successes in the twentieth 
century. The undermining of apartheid in South Africa had both international 
and domestic sources, both moral and political causes. Decolonization, de-
segregation and civil rights movements are very important elements in the 
affirmative and inclusionary history of the twentieth century. Inclusion, by Brendan O'Leary  Page 6  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  6
implication, encompasses  sets of policies, institutions and practices that both do 
not coercively homogenize peoples,  that do not entrench unjustified differential 
treatments of peoples,  and that are embedded in the practices of  well-ordered 
states. Elaborating this understanding  is the purpose of this paper. 
 
2. Assimilation. 
The political and cultural homogenization of people is the underling goal of 
many states that promote assimilation.  Historically it has been an important 
policy of inclusion in two model and hegemonic states, the USA and France5, 
both of which have influenced the political development of many member-states 
of the UN. We may be tempted to define assimilation by  dictionary entries in 
English and French.  The Oxford English Dictionary   tells us that to assimilate 
means to 
1. Absorb and digest (food etc.) into the body,   absorb (information etc.) 
into the mind,  absorb (people) into  a larger group. 
2. Make like; cause to resemble. 
3. Make a (sound) more like another in the same or next word. 
4. Be absorbed into the body, mind, or a larger group (Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary  1990) .  
The first, second and last  of these meanings point towards the term’s political 
connotations, and  highlight  the experiential fears attached to ‘absorption’ and 
‘digestion’, as well as the more neutral implications of ‘becoming alike’, or Brendan O'Leary  Page 7  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  7
‘coming to resemble’.  The Concise Oxford French Dictionary tells us that when 
translating French into English that assimiler may mean  
1.  To assimilate; to liken, to equate;  
2.  To digest;  
3.  To integrate; s’~ qch. To be assimilated; to be integrated; s’~ qch., to adopt, 
to incorporate (sth. foreign).  
This suggests, among other things, that in French the notions of ‘assimilation’ 
and ‘integration’ are fused, which may be an outcome of French political 
practices and beliefs. The same dictionary,  in guiding us in translation from 
English into French,  counsels us that ‘to assimilate’ should be translated by 
assimiler; but  that ‘to integrate’ should be translated as compléter (when it means 
‘to complete’), as unifier (when it means ‘to form into a whole’); and as intégrer 
(when it means ‘to assimilate’)  (Concise Oxford French Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1980). 
These inspections suggest the need to move beyond ordinary usages in both 
languages to achieve clarity. 
 
Assimilation, as a strategy of national and ethnic conflict regulation, may be 
defined as  (the voluntary or coercive) erosion of politically and privately salient 
cultural differences between groups, with the intent of achieving national or 
ethnic homogenization. It achieves inclusion through making common citizens in 
public and private domains who are not culturally differentiated for political 
purposes.  Acculturation involves assimilation by culturally weaker groups, Brendan O'Leary  Page 8  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  8
where, for example the members of group B absorb group A’s culture: A + B = A. 
Fusion, by contrast, involves assimilation through a full-scale merger that 
produces a novel entity, e.g. three groups A, B and C fuse to form a novel group, 
D: A + B + C = D. What differentiates assimilation as a public policy from both 
integration and multi-culturalism, it may be suggested, in accordance with much 
recent social science literature, is that assimilation eliminates public and private 
differences between people’s cultures, whereas integration eliminates public 
differences between people’s cultures but not necessarily their private cultural 
differences; multiculturalism, by contrast, maintains (some) public and private 
differences between people’s cultures.  
 
Coercive assimilation excludes certain identities by compulsion. It is experienced 
by its victims as “linguicide”, “ethnocide” or “theocide”, referring to the 
destruction of languages, hereditary communities of descent,  and religious 
institutions and practices respectively. Linguistic standardization is a common 
feature of a coercively assimilationist state. One langauge, one grammar, and in 
extremis one correct intonation is mandated by the public authorities. One 
language has a monopoly of the public domain; other languages (stigmatized as 
dialects or patois) may be illegalized in private – as General Franco of Spain  
illegalized Euskedi in the Basque country, and as General Attaturk illegalized 
Kurdish in Turkey. Schools, universities, armies, parliaments, assemblies and 
councils, bureaucracies and legal institutions are used to socialize all the targets Brendan O'Leary  Page 9  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  9
of the policy in the mandated language. Assimilation of this kind may extend to 
‘namification’: standardizing and regulating ‘private’ naming,  limiting the stock 
and extension of legitimate surnames and first names of persons, and of public 
signage, street-names and toponyms.  Saddam Hussein’s Arabization of Kurds 
and Turkomen included Arabic namification. Assimilation may also involve 
historical standardization: the reconstruction of a common past based more on 
amnesia than a representative sample of historical testimonies. It usually 
involves the illegalization and repression of nationalist, ethnic and communal 
parties and discourses that are opposed to the dominant nation’s assimilationist 
program. In this manner Turkish governments have outlawed both overtly 
Kurdish and Islamist parties and declared Kurds to be ‘mountain Turks’6. 
Coercive assimilation may involve deliberate residential and employment 
policies to disperse immigrants and indigenous minorities,   weakening  their 
capacities for biological and cultural reproduction to encourage both 
acculturation and fusion. Within formal democracies it will invariably involve 
territorial governance and systems of decentralization designed to prevent 
national, ethnic, religious  and cultural minorities from having the possibility of 
forming local political majorities. 
 
Voluntary assimilation, by contrast, works though both market and public policy 
incentives. Citizens and immigrants may converge on learning languages that 
are useful for communication, their education and the development of their Brendan O'Leary  Page 10 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  10
wider human capital. This fact accounts for the success of distinct lingua franca 
around the world, including languages like Swahili and former colonial 
languages, such as English, Spanish, French, Portuguese and Russian. Citizens 
and immigrants may change their religious identities or beliefs in the interests of 
status enhancement. They may acculturate to political practices and mores when 
they are welcomed when they do so. Shared citizenship and common public   
deliberation may lead to a shared identity and the loss of historic cultural ties. 
Persons  may inter-marry across traditional endogamous barriers between races, 
ethnic communities and religions. Voluntary assimilation may be praised as it 
has been in immigrant states, such as the USA,7 Canada8, Australia9 and 
Argentina.    
 
The declared goals and the motives of state officials who have encouraged 
assimilation - or promoted it through coercion - have often been inclusionary and 
developmental in the broad senses of these terms. They have portrayed 
assimilation as “nation-building”, promoting equality among citizens, and 
fraternity (not in an exclusively male sense, but as ‘solidarity’). Through a 
common individualism a common, deliberate and energised nation may 
develop10. In 1789 in emancipating the Jews it was said before the French 
National Assembly that,   <<Aux Juifs comme nation nous ne donnons rien; aux 
Juifs comme individous nous donnons tout>> -  ‘For the Jews as a nation we 
grant them nothing; for the Jews as individuals we grant them everything’11. Brendan O'Leary  Page 11 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  11
Assimilationists have also promoted nation-building to achieve state 
consolidation and military security,12 but usually they have argued that 
assimilation promotes civilizational uplift; as John Stuart Mill famously (or 
infamously)  suggested of “peripheral” Europeans: “Nobody can suppose that it 
is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought 
into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated 
people — to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to 
all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French 
protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power — than to sulk on his 
own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental 
orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The 
same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of 
the British nation”13. The defence of assimilation as broadening one’s 
developmental horizons has gone beyond the claim that  it is better not to sit on 
rocks. Assimilationists argue that their policies ‘de-parochialize’ people; they 
encourage cosmopolitanism; they help break the suffocating loyalties of tribes, 
clans, of kin, of what Ernest Gellner called the “tyranny of cousins”14; and, not 
least, they claim that assimilation (into a high modern culture) frees children and 
women from the stifling chains of patriarchy.  
 
Coercive assimilation, on most criteria, is, however, directly contrary to one of 
the international bills of rights. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil Brendan O'Leary  Page 12 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  12
and Political Rights declares that “In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such persons shall not be denied 
the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”. 
This clause does not directly protect national minorities, as opposed to the 
specified minorities. By their actions coercive assimilationists usually provoke 
national, ethnic and cultural revivalist movements, and, in their immediate 
wake, secessionist movements – experiences which have occurred recently in 
Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey.  
 
That said, voluntary assimilation, as a model of inclusion, might work in certain 
conditions. Evidence of success of voluntary assimilation is found in states where 
there is large-scale inter-marriage - or child-bearing - across historical national, 
ethnic and religious boundaries; in the existence of hybrids, fusions, mulattoes, 
mestizos, and creoles; in the free development of political parties and party 
platforms and electoral competition over non-national, non-ethnic and non-
religious issues; and in the consensual shunning of policies, programs and 
institutions that might politically highlight salient cleavages between the 
descendants of historic communities. Believing that is (or should be) its past the 
French state often declared that Article 27 of the International Covenant is not 
applicable in France, because France has no minorities, and to confess the 
existence of minorities is to admit discrimination15.  Brendan O'Leary  Page 13 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  13
 
Mutually agreed assimilation projects by definition have excellent prospects of 
success – though that is not to say that they are irreversible. There are, however, 
severe constraints on voluntary assimilationist projects. One blockage may lie 
within strata of the Staatsvolk, the dominant people. Either its elites or its less 
advantaged may resist assimilation if they see it as entailing undesirable cultural 
transformations or losses of economic or other advantages. They may set limits 
to the scale and pace of immigration for these reasons16. They may refuse to fuse 
or share space with national minorities who share historic residency in their 
territory. Another source of blockage may lie within the weaker communities, 
the presumed beneficiaries of acculturation or fusion. They may wish to retain – 
and develop - their cultures for both defensive and developmental reasons. 
Where the status of the homeland people is contested thoroughgoing voluntary 
assimilation is not known in modern times17. Acculturation, especially, appears 
to involve a collective surrender of group identity, ethnicity, language and 
religiosity. This complaint, well-grounded, is that of the proclaimed indigenous 
peoples of the world and their empathizers. Lastly, there is some evidence to 
suggest that at least two contemporary planet-wide “mega-trends” inhibit the 
prospects of extensive voluntary assimilation. One is the fact of large-scale 
migration  and refugee movements  which inhibit the “purification” of nation-
states within the better-off and more well-ordered states; and the second is the 
greater ease with which migrant communities today may retain the culture,   Brendan O'Leary  Page 14 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  14
especially the language and religion, of their homelands through easy access to 
mass and customized media in print and electronic formats.  
 
Voluntary assimilation works best through indirect incentives, and works most 
effectively upon voluntary immigrants  willing to trade their culture in return for 
citizenship. It does not work so easily with forced immigrants (slaves and their 
descendants) or with homeland and indigenous peoples. Voluntary assimilation 
has many benefits in expanding the repertoire of human capacities for choice and 
development but it is not without psychic costs for those who acculturate or 
fuse18. But, very often assimilationists are exclusionists, policy-makers and 
people who wish to imprint their cultures on others – albeit for their mutual 
benefit. Such assimilationists are  prime source of collective antagonisms. 
“Nationalizing states”19  in both post-colonial and post-communist settings have 
reaped what they have sown, i.e. protests, riots, armed secessionism, and 
external interventions. “Sinhala only” policies in Sri Lanka, “Hindustani” 
policies in India, “protecting Serbia” in the former Yugoslavia, “Arabization” in 
Iraq and Islamization in the Sudan register similar stories and counter-stories. 
Coercive homogenization generates a predictable backlash among those with the 
capacities to lash back. It is of interest that anti-assimilationist and anti-
globalization discourses draw from the same repertoire of arguments. 
 
3. Integration and Multiculturalism Brendan O'Leary  Page 15 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  15
The language and practices of “integrationists” are, at first glance, much more 
generously inclusionary than those of assimilationists. Integration here is defined 
as a strategy that seeks to eliminate national, ethno-national, and cultural 
differences from having salience in the public domain. The object is to create a 
common unifying citizenship or civic national identity. In the English language it 
is rendered under formulae that have the same substantive meanings:  “liberal 
patriotism”, “civic nationalism”, “constitutional patriotism”, “republicanism”, 
“unionism”, “privatization of culture”20, “difference-blind liberalism”, 
“individualism”. Under these banners citizens are to be treated as equals, 
regardless of their national, ethnic or cultural characteristics or origins.   
Integration fosters the removal of ethnic identities from the political arena.  It 
attempts to remove barriers to access and mobility that might otherwise be 
imposed on minority communities and identities.  Integration does not, as a 
matter of policy, seek the destruction, eradication, or erosion of these identities;  
they are simply to be “privatized” and tolerated. Integration has as its nominal 
focal concern the human individual. It   promotes the primacy of the individual 
over that of the group, freedom from group control, or, as it is often put,   
“freedom from”, period. Integration rejects unreasonable, i.e. non-merit-based, 
discrimination in political representation, the legal system, education and 
employment. “Equal citizenship” is its motto.  
 Brendan O'Leary  Page 16 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  16
Integration eliminates the relevance of difference in culture (of origin) among 
citizens while managing cultural differences through their privatization. Each 
may have their own religion provided it is not brought into the legislature or 
imposed on others; each may have their own language at home – or in private 
schools, as long as no attempt is made to disrupt national unity through bi- or 
multi-lingualism. Integration is said to be the ideal for liberal democracies: 
creating a common public culture, but leaving to citizens to choose their 
communities of belonging in private domains, enabling them to maintain their 
cultures without being constrained by them. Integration promotes one public 
identity for citizens but allows them as many private identities as are compatible 
with the liberties of others. 
 
Public officials,  aware that assimilation may provoke negative reactions and 
hostility,  may pursue integration.  So may  new governing elites sincerely intent 
on overturning a genocidal and coercively homogenizing past. It may be sought 
by those who have been excluded or treated as second class citizens,  e.g. African 
Americans, where the African denotes community of origin, or by those who are 
recent arrivals (e.g. migrants, guest-workers, metics or permanent residents who 
wish to become citizens). Where integration is sought both from above and 
below its inclusionary character is indisputable. 
 
In constitutional norms, laws and public policies integrationists may appear to Brendan O'Leary  Page 17 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  17
differ little from voluntary assimilationists. They want no publicly 
institutionalized recognition of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
differences; they promote territorial governance structures that avoid the 
ethnicization of units; they affirm the merits of political parties and electoral 
systems that encourage parties to compete on principled programs – or indeed 
socio-economic and class differences – rather than on cleavages based on 
nationality, language or theology; they desire voters to “pool” their votes across 
historic communities of origin; they argue for a common public education system 
and a common curriculum  at all levels of development – the school and the 
university will overcome the parochial and discriminatory impulses of the 
family, the clan, the tribe, the church, synagogue, temple and mosque; they 
promote public and private sector housing policies that  “mix” people and avoid 
the creation of ghettoes; they encourage an ethic of citizenship, insisting 
citizenship rights should  not be  given to immigrants before at least partial 
mastery of their new public culture is evident.  
 
But, integrationists maintain, there is a major difference between themselves and 
assimilationists. They are liberals. They are neither coercive homogenizers, nor 
homogenizers (except in one domain), and so they see themselves as more 
inclusionary. Critics argue that integration is, however, not as neutral as its 
exponents pretend. Its inclusions have price-tags.  The integrationist state has a 
face; the state broadcasts; the state dresses; the state has styles; the state defines Brendan O'Leary  Page 18 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  18
what is public and what is private. The state just cannot be as difference-blind 
patriotic,  constitutionally neutral and civic as some advocate, or pretend. Its 
business is conducted in a language, the language of the Staatsvolk. Its neutrality 
will benefit one community’s religion: after all, what holidays (holy-days) are 
public, and why? Its dominant community will have its culture fully expressed 
in both the public and private domains; others will not be so fortunate. That 
which is “civic” inevitably has cultural and ethnic content, even if civic 
membership is in principle open to all-comers21. Integration, may be a fair 
contract for voluntary migrants willing to pay the price of learning a new public 
culture, but for others it may be a provocative imposition: a partisan desire to 
disorganize historic nationalities or indigenous peoples on their homelands22. 
Lastly, critics of integration deny that it can lead to a permanent or stable 
settlement. They maintain that integration is an unstable equilibrium, either a 
waiting room for assimilation, or for multi-culturalism. If cultures are not 
sustained by governmental resources they may wither in the private domain, an 
argument that seems especially true of languages – but less so of religions23. If  
integrationists cannot ban the intrusion of arguments, interest-groups and parties 
that promote agendas different from that of the approved public culture then 
democratic practices will inevitably take on a more multicultural character.  
 
Multi-culturalism is one of the most contested and discussed terms of our times 
in both political philosophy and comparative politics24. It has been used to Brendan O'Leary  Page 19 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  19
describe the demography of states, philosophical relativism, the beliefs of 
literature and anthropology professors, fashions, architectures and cuisines. Here 
I define it to  describe official state constitutions, legal norms and public policies 
that institutionalize more than one culture (be it national, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious) in the public domain, as well as permitting more than one culture to 
flourish in the private domain. Self-styled multi-culturalists generally portray 
themselves as more pluralist, authentically choice-enhancing, and more 
politically inclusionary than integrationists or assimilationists.  Sometimes this is 
true; sometimes it is not. For example, Switzerland, for many the model of a 
successful multi-cultural democracy – an argument with much merit, historically 
excluded women from the comprehensive adult suffrage for longer than all of its 
European neighbors, and presently excludes one fifth of its residents, guest-
workers, from having full citizenship rights.  
 
We may differentiate multi-cultural states in four ways that sometimes overlap. 
One, by the nature of the cultures that are politically included in the multi-
cultural pact.  Are they national, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or some 
permutation thereof? Is the state bi- or multi-national, bi- or multi-ethnic, bi- or 
multi-lingual, bi- or multi-religious? And, are some (homeland and immigrant) 
cultures not included fully in the public domain while others are? Two, by the 
categories of culture included.  This review cannot consider all the identities and 
cultures covered under some discussions of multi-culturalism, such as gendered Brendan O'Leary  Page 20 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  20
and sexual orientations, or class and caste divisions; here the focus is on 
encompassing cultures, sometimes called “societal cultures”, that could in 
principle be deployed for nation-building. Three, by their degree of 
institutionalization. Are the relevant cultures merely symbolically recognized on 
an equal footing? Are they present in the executive, the legislature, the legal 
system, the security forces, public bureaucracies, educational institutions, and 
personal law? And four, by their territorial organization: Are the relevant 
cultures granted their own territorial domains in which their members have self-
government? Are cultural rights distributed equally or asymmetrically across the 
state? Rather than explore these four variations in depth,  for simplicity’s sake it 
is easier to distinguish two dominant forms of political multi-culturalism within 
states25 which organize with respect to encompassing cultures, are intended to be 
inclusive, and have distinct styles of institutionalization and territorialization, i.e. 
arrangements inspired by consociational and federalist thinking respectively.   
These are considered in order.  
 
4. Consociational arrangements 
Consociation, from “con, with”, and “societas, community”, is a multi-society 
political system with both inclusionary shared rule and autonomous self-rule. 
Shared rule is expressed through:  
(a) cross-community executive power-sharing, and through the application of  
(b) proportionality  rules of representation and distribution of benefits to Brendan O'Leary  Page 21 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  21
communities in political institutions and the public sector.   
Self-rule is expressed through  
(c) allowing the communities to govern themselves at least with respect to 
key components of their culture – e.g.  linguistic, religious or educational 
autonomy.  
Consociations may have a fourth trait connected to both shared and self-rule: 
(d) they may empower community leaders with veto rights over 
constitutional or key policy changes.  
Consociations may be found in sovereign states, in regions of states;  and 
elements of consociational arrangements are identical to those that characterize 
many confederations of meber-states.  
 
Consociational thinking has a long pedigree. In the western world its lineages 
may be traced to the sixteenth century Protestant philosopher Johannes 
Althusius (1557-1638), the early twentieth century Austro-Marxists, Karl Renner 
and Otto Bauer, and, more recently, the Nobel Laureate, Sir Arthur Lewis. It is 
associated in our times with Arend Lijphart, a distinguished past president of the 
American Political Science Association, 26 who has generated a large research 
program on the subject. Consociational thinking is not restricted to the academy.  
Politicians have refined, innovated and reinvented consociational institutions 
and practices in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Northern 
Ireland, the Lebanon, and Macedonia.  On occasions, in the guise of “power-Brendan O'Leary  Page 22 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  22
sharing”27, consociation is the prescribed method of conflict regulation of the 
international community.  This has been evident in the internationally 
supported, implemented, and maintained power-sharing agreements in 
Afghanistan, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Northern Ireland, as well as 
in prospective power-sharing agreements in Cyprus and Sri Lanka. It may 
become evident in post-occupation Iraq.   There is, however, no consensus over 
consociational theory. Two axes of disagreement are prominent: 
consociationalists and their critics differ over the normative merits of 
consociation; and over how consociations are established, maintained, or 
breakdown. Here we focus on the first axis of disagreement. 
 
A.  Arguments Made Against Consociation. Conservatives, liberals, socialists and 
feminists attack consociational prescription and explanation. Conservatives 
detect a hint of utopianism, and are right to detect “rationalism”, the belief that it 
is sometimes possible to engage our reason in benign political engineering. 
Conservatives tend to condemn consociational ideas as futile: they say such ideas 
will have no (or no long-run) impact on deeply-rooted, zero-sum identity based 
conflicts. This is the archetypal conservative riposte;  consociations make no 
difference; or, they don’t work, ergo they are not a remedy. A more sophisticated 
variation of this thesis is that consociations are only likely to work well where 
they are not needed, or are redundant (i.e. in moderately rather than deeply 
divided societies).  Donald Horowitz maintains that consociations “are more Brendan O'Leary  Page 23 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  23
likely the product of resolved struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages”, and 
that they are “inapt to mitigate conflict in severely divided societies.”28 
 
Critics of consociational ideas are especially prominent among liberals, socialists 
and feminists who pride themselves on their universalism, developmentalism, 
and democratic dispositions. They often argue that consociations are perverse, 
achieving the opposite of their ostensible purposes. Consociation, such critics 
reason, reinforces the presumed sources of conflict;  it reinforces divisive 
traditions; it freezes and privileges  (undesirable) collective identities at the 
expense of emancipated or more “progressive” identities; it does not resolve 
conflict. At best, it organizes and regulates a stalemate around the relevant 
collective identities; it encourages a politics of immobilism and gridlock. Paul 
Brass is typical when he argues that the elites whose prudence is hailed by 
consociationalists are the very ones with vested interests in maintaining 
collective antagonisms. Consociation, he claims, reinforces their respective 
dominance within their own communities. Consociation’s proponents   are said 
to operate with the “mistaken assumption that cultural differences among ethnic 
groups are “objective” factors”, and to exaggerate the problems associated with 
strong collective identities, and to assume that  “ethnic divisions are more 
inflammatory than other types.”29 Liberal, socialist and feminist critics suggest 
consociation is informed by primordial pessimism.  They see consociationalists 
as conservatives, who take people as they are (or have been made to be) and not Brendan O'Leary  Page 24 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  24
as they might be (or long to be). Political integration, the creation of a common 
citizenship and public sphere, and the non-recognition of cultural differences in 
the public domain, from this perspective, is much preferred. As Brass puts it, it is 
best to “keep some possibility for change, internal division [of communities], and 
secularization open, for the sake of the ultimate integration of the people in a 
common political order and to preserve individual rights and the future 
prospects of individual autonomy”30.  
 
Another standard objection to consociation is that it jeopardizes important values, 
principles and institutions on the altar of reinforced national, ethnic, linguistic 
and religious identities. Encouraging proportional representation, it is said, will 
lead to the likely irreversible formation of ethnic, communal or sectarian parties, 
thereby breaking with the possibilities afforded by a politics of programs and 
interests, as opposed to a more intractable politics based on identities. Quotas or 
preferential policies will lead to the weakening of the merit principle – thereby 
creating new injustices as well as inefficiencies in resource allocation31.   
Recognition of difference in the public domain will progressively lead to respect 
for (unjustified) inequalities, the unequal treatment of similarly situated 
individuals and groups. Brass speaks for these critics when he asserts that 
“Consociational democracy inevitably violates the rights of some groups and the 
rights of some individuals”32. Brass also claims consociational politics is 
undemocratic; it excludes opposition; it is a loser-takes-all system; “a fully-Brendan O'Leary  Page 25 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  25
developed consociational system is inherently undemocratic”; it is elitist and 
postpones rather than facilitates the  “democratization of multi-ethnic societies”. 
Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro concur: consociation permits “the same 
combinations of elites to entrench themselves at the peaks of spoils and 
patronage hierarchies more or less continuously”; it emphasizes “participation 
and representation to the virtual exclusion of opposition”; the “democratic 
benefits that can accrue from “tossing the rascals out” are unavailable”; 
consociational systems “do not give powerful parliamentary players incentives 
to keep government honest by shining light in dark corners”. “Mutual vetoes can 
be expected to lead to mutual logrolling, rather than to political confrontations 
among elites, and to promote insider clubism”. The price of consociation it seems 
is “abandoning a viable opposition politics”33. The same authors suggest that 
consociational systems – as with negotiated agreements or “transplacements” – 
do not meet Samuel Huntington’s definitional test of a democracy, two peaceful 
turnovers of power following elections34. The charge that consociation is 
undemocratic is perhaps the strongest normative objection that is raised35. 
Arguments in this vein celebrate the merits of oppositional politics. 
Consociation’s opposition to adversarial democratic politics is just wrong-
headed maintains Brass. Adversarial politics, he insists,  “have in fact worked to 
an extent in non-homogeneous societies such as Great Britain … and in the US”36. 
Adversarial politics in Canada, India and Sri Lanka, he maintains, are no worse 
than the allegedly consociational experiences of Malaysia, Lebanon, and Cyprus. Brendan O'Leary  Page 26 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  26
 
A last argument sometimes deployed against consociations is the outright denial 
of their existence. Sometimes this argument rests on the alleged incoherence of 
consociational ideas37.  A Marxist variation on the illusory quality of consociation 
suggests it is a mirage with consequences: it divides and disorganizes the 
working class around false identities38.  
 
This summation of anti-consociational arguments is not a caricature, and not 
based on selecting the worst rhetorical excesses39. While one must concede that 
critics of consociation have pointed to difficulties in Lijphart’s formulations and 
expositions (to which he has made measured and reasoned responses), plainly it 
cannot be true that consociation is simultaneously perverse, i.e. reinforces and re-
entrenches ethnic antagonisms, and at the same time jeopardizes all key liberal, 
democratic and international values, and, all the while is futile, i.e. makes no 
difference.  The futility thesis is evidently the weakest of the criticisms of 
consociation, and it is fair to say that the weight of the critics’ case rest on 
perversity and jeopardy arguments.  
 
B. Political Arguments For Consociation. Consociationalists understand themselves 
as realists, counselors of necessary triage, and as inclusive democrats. They are 
just as concerned about justice and freedom as their critics. They submit that 
consociational settlements are “naturally” recurrent phenomena --- generated Brendan O'Leary  Page 27 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  27
through negotiations by politicians after the failure of homogenizing or 
exclusionary politics. They argue that certain collective identities, especially 
those based on nationality, ethnicity, language and religion, are generally fairly 
durable once formed, especially when they have been politicized.  To say they 
are durable, or are likely to be durable, is not to say that they are either 
primordial or immutable, or necessarily throat-cutting. But durable identities, as 
opposed to shallow and malleable interests and identities, can be, and often are 
mobilized in a politics of antagonism, perhaps especially during the 
democratization of political systems. Politicians, parties, and communities 
themselves interpret their histories and futures through powerful narratives, 
myths and symbols as well as through realistic rather than merely prejudiced 
appraisals of past group antagonisms. These narratives, myths and symbols may 
have significant resonance and truth-content – without these traits politicians, 
ceteris paribus, might be less successful in their manipulative endeavors. 
Consociationalists demur at the suggestion that they are utopian:  it is 
integrationists who are too facile about the capacities of political regimes to 
dissolve, transform or transcend inherited collective identities. Consociationalists 
operate with a hermeneutics of suspicion. They question the cosmopolitan or 
emancipatory protestations of many anti-consociationalists. These protestations, 
they think, too often cloak a partisan endorsement of one community’s identity 
and interests (into which others are to be “encouraged” to integrate or 
assimilate).  Brendan O'Leary  Page 28 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  28
 
Consociationalists argue from a standpoint of moral and political necessity: they 
do not embrace pluralism for its own sake, or because they want a romantic 
Herderian celebration of a thousand different flowers (or weeds). They maintain 
that a hard-confrontation with reality in certain conjunctures forces certain 
options on decision-makers in (potentially) deeply divided territories; and in 
some tough cases, their claim is that the effective choice is between 
consociational arrangements and worse alternatives: sustained armed conflict, 
genocide, ethnic expulsion, imposed partition, or imposed control. Their view is 
that it is best not to have to build democracy after filling graveyards.  Negotiated 
consociation is better than winner-takes-all, especially where taking all implies 
defining the state, and killing, expelling or assimilating the losers.  
 
Consociationalists maintain that democratic versions of socialism and liberalism 
may sometime be feasible only within consociational buildings (either as 
temporary constructions or as more durable dwellings). They invoke necessity 
and realism to challenge the confidence of liberals in majoritarian and 
adversarial democracy. J.S. Mill famously warned of the dangers of a tyranny of 
the majority, but in his most illustrious texts he failed to emphasize that a 
national, or ethnic exclusionary tyranny was feasible within democratic 
institutions40.  Consociationalists are mostly liberals, but they are cautiously 
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transformation, peace-making, peace-building, and inclusion. In divided 
territories, they observe, there is more than one society and their relations may be 
far from civil. A well ordered system of governance is necessary to enable 
effective civil societies to flourish. Those who embrace a politics of deliberative 
democracy as the prescription for conflict-resolution need reminding that 
deliberation takes place in languages, dialects, accents and ethnically toned 
voices, and that it is not often possible to create “ideal speech situations”. 
Consociationalists respond to socialists in two ways: one, by showing that 
consociational ideas have been present in the best of the socialist tradition41; and 
two, by observing just how regularly and pervasively working class and popular 
unity has historically been rendered hopeless by national, ethnic, religious and 
communal divisions that might have been amenable to consociational treatment. 
Within consociational arrangements trust may develop that may enable wider 
working class or popular unity behind the welfare state or other forms of 
progressive distributive politics.  
 
Consociationalists are friends of democracy as well as critics of its palpably 
inappropriate versions. Consociationalists want majorities rather than the 
majority, or the plurality, to control or influence government. Lijphart modestly 
credits the contemporary invention (though not the naming) of consociational 
democracy to Sir Arthur Lewis, the Nobel-prize winning economist, who argued 
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West Africa suffered from the inheritance of British and French majoritarian or 
winner-takes-all democratic systems. He reasoned that what they required were 
wide and inclusive coalition governments, PR electoral systems, and federations 
that would give ethnic communities territorial autonomy. Lewis’s argument was 
made by deduction: he did not draw on an extensive empirical comparative 
politics of democratic types. But his arguments withstand empirical evaluation. 
Majoritarian democracy,  especially based on a single-party government rooted 
in one community, is, consociationalists say, very likely to provoke serious 
communal conflict in territories with two or more significantly sized 
communities with durable identities differentiated by nationality, ethnicity, 
language and religion. Political bargaining and adjustment among leaders 
should be designed to achieve widespread consensus  – to prevent the possibility 
that democracy will degenerate into a war of communities.  Realists should 
therefore, in their view, endorse a politics of accommodation, of leaving each 
group to their own affairs where that is possible and widely sought – “good 
fences make good neighbors”. Consociation should be designed to protect basic 
natural rights, of individuals and communities, the most important right being 
the right to exist:  the international law of Grotius applied within states. 
 
Consociationalists argue positively, not just by pointing to the horrors of the 
alternatives. Consociation provides autonomy, and enables sensible shared inter-
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they have a better and more inclusive model of democracy for certain pluralist 
states. Much more of the people than a plurality or a majority may influence or 
control the executive. Much more than a majority gets effective “voice”. 
Consociation does not eliminate democratic opposition within communities, but 
enables such divisions and oppositions as exist to flourish in conditions of 
security. Nothing precludes intra-bloc democratic competition, and turnover of 
political elites, and shifts of support between parties; and in a liberal consociation 
nothing necessarily blocks the dissolution of historic identities if that is what 
voters want. Consociationalists do not say that achieving accountability over 
political leaders and parties is not a problem. They merely claim that there is no 
insuperable problem within consociational arrangements. Indeed it is a fallacy to 
suppose that consociation mandates that all governments be wholly 
encompassing grand coalitions. Since this fallacy is so widespread it needs to be 
carefully rebutted.  
 
C.  Consociation, Democratic Inclusion and Opposition. There is variety within 
consociations, both in their degree of inclusiveness and of democracy. We may 
distinguish between complete, concurrent and weak democratic consociational 
executives.  
 
A democratic consociational executive is complete when the political leaders of 
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Imagine there are two ethnic groups, NA and NB, and that all their voters split 
their votes between two political parties respectively, giving rise to a four party 
political system, A1, A2, supported by community NA, and B1, B2, supported by 
community  NB.  In a complete consociation these four parties will all be 
represented in the executive. This hypothetical scenario corresponds to the idea 
of  “grand coalition”. But not all consociational executives need be “grand”, 
implying “total” and “all-encompassing”. What matters is meaningful, cross-
community, joint decision-making within the executive.  There may be cases 
where political parties choose to exclude their leaders from office by refusing to 
sit in a coalition government – and insist on being in opposition by choice. 
Imagine that parties A2 and B2  in the above example decide to exclude 
themselves. In this case each community has representation in the executive, 
from parties A1 and   B 1, but not all of each communities’ leaders are present. 
Likewise, a cross-community coalition may exclude some hard-line ethnic parties 
from the executive. This need not be either anti-consociational or anti-
democratic. We may say that a democratic consociational executive is concurrent 
when each significant ethnic community has representation in the executive and 
that executive has at least majority support from each such significant 
community. To clarify these distinctions consider the Nagel spectrum42 that 
ranges from rule by one (dictatorship), to rule by all (unanimity or perfect 
consensus), i.e. from 1/N to N, where N is the number of voters (See Figure 1.1). 
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unanimity can be described on the basis of how many (actual or potential) voters 
influence (or control) the government. Where democracy masks rule by a small 
number who control the agenda and have their preferences translated into public 
policy against the preferences of the overwhelming majority then this is elite 
rule. Where a faction of a party controls a cabinet which in turn controls a 
legislative party which can determine law and public policy against the 
preferences of a significant majority of voters then this is factional rule. Where a 
plurality of voters, under “winner takes all” electoral systems, elects a 
government that carries out their wishes, we have what Nagel deems   
“pluralitarian” democracy. Where over a majority (N/2 + 1) of voters influence 
governmental policy then we have majoritarian democracy; where over two 
thirds of voters support government policy we have “supermajoritarian” 
democracy; and, lastly, where nearly all voters support government policy we 
have consensus democracy. Brendan O'Leary  Page 34 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  34
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Figure 1.1. The Nagel Spectrum: The Scope of Popular Support for an Executive 
 
We may now describe both complete and concurrent democratic consociational 
executives, and two further categories of   weak and authoritarian consociational 
executives. In an executive that is complete each community of voters, NA and 
NB, and so on, has all its parties in the executive, leading to consensus across all 
peoples in the consociation (here there is for the time being no formal prospect of 
organized opposition). In the example we have used above the executive would 
comprise parties A1A2B1B2. By contrast, a concurrent consociational executive is Brendan O'Leary  Page 35 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  35
one in which each significant community, NA and NB, and so on, has over half of 
its voters supporting parties in the government and acting on their behalf, but 
less than the level of representation that would exist with consensus support in 
each community. In the example we have been using the executive would 
comprise A1B1, and each party would have majority support within their 
respective communities, NA and NB. A democratic executive may be described as 
weakly consociational when each significant community, NA and NB, and so on, 
has competitively elected political leaders in the executive, but only to the extent 
that in at least one community the relevant leadership has just plurality support 
among the relevant voters. An executive remains weakly consociational, by this 
typification, if one or more community merely gives its plurality assent while 
other communities give majority or higher levels of support to the government. 
An illustration of a weakly consociational executive from our stylized example 
would be a government comprised of leaders of parties A1and B1, each of which 
is the largest (but not majority party) in its community, and each of which is 
opposed by a range of smaller parties within each community, e.g. A2 A3… An,  
and B2, B3, … B an. The Nagel spectrum can lastly  be employed to describe non-
democratic consociations: where unrepresentative factions or elites 
(authoritarians) from each community share executive power with one another, 
but are not effectively democratically accountable to (their own or any) ethnic 
communities. Post-Tito and pre-disintegration Yugoslavia may reasonably be 
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communist rule. Where executives have democratic support within one 
community but co-opt an unrepresentative faction or elite from another 
community we do not have an authentic democratic consociational system, 
because the “joint-ness” across communities is fraudulent: we have a system of 
control, albeit with a pseudo-consociational veneer. 
 
This clarification, distinguishing complete, concurrent, weak and authoritarian 
consociational executives, is operational. Table 1.1.  illustrates  classifications on 
the basis of our stylized example43. This excursus should  resolve the recurrent 
and widespread misperception that a democratic consociation requires a 
complete, total or all-encompassing grand coalition in the executive (or in other 
institutions), and thereby precludes opposition, dissent and other features of a 
well-ordered democracy. What a democratic consociation must have is 
meaningful cross-community executive power-sharing in which each significant 
community is represented in the government with at least plurality levels of 
support within its community44. This clarification refutes the insistence that all 
consociational practices are inherently undemocratic because they preclude 
opposition.  
 
This distinction between complete, concurrent, and weak consociational 
executives need not be applied just to executives. It is equally fruitful to apply 
these distinctions to legislative procedures, and especially constitutional Brendan O'Leary  Page 37 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  37
amendment procedures – not least because these will normally have a bearing 
upon the capacities of executives. 
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Figure 1.2. Nagel spectra applied to two ethnic communities, with each spectrum describing 
support for the executive within each community. 
Community A  Community B  Type of consociation 






























Factional authoritarian and control 
Elite Elite Oligarchic 
Dictatorship -  - 
Table 1.1.  Variations in Public Support Within Two Communities for Power-Sharing Executives 
 
Having established that consociational executives need not be all-inclusive grand 
coalitions we may turn more briefly to other controversies in considering the 
democratic character of consociational executives. Consociations may exist which 
do not include all communities in government. This situation arises trivially in 
any large and complex state or region in which there are numerous small ethnic 
minorities and categories of persons (especially as a result of recent immigration) 
that are not sufficiently demographically, electorally or politically significant to 
be organized into any consociational settlement. Thus the non-representation of 
Polish immigrants to the Lebanon in its political arrangements, or of Indian 
immigrants in Northern Ireland’s arrangements, does not disprove the existence 
of a consociation.  
 
But consociational practices may prevail without the participation of one or more 
demographically, electorally and politically significant ethnic community.  For 
example, a dominant coalition may practice consociation among the partners but 
deliberately exclude another community, i.e. consociation for the dominant and 
control over the dominated. One extension of Lijphart’s discussions is to treat 
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Jews) and Likud (predominantly supported by Mizrahi Jews) coalitions as an 
illustration of this scenario: consociation among ethnically differentiated Jews, 
but joint control by Israeli Jews over Palestinians in Israel (and in the Palestinian 
Authority). It is also possible that a whole community, or a significant majority of 
a community, may refuse to participate in consociational arrangements, even 
though offered places. This is voluntary self-exclusion. Another way in which a 
community, or a party from a community, may be excluded from representation 
in an executive is through threshold effects that do not cast any immediate 
doubts on the democratic rules of the game or on the motivations of the 
constitutional designers. Any electoral system to choose a congress, assembly or 
parliament, automatically has some logical or formal threshold that candidates or 
parties have to achieve before winning representation45. Likewise consociational 
executives may have formal rules that produce thresholds of electoral support 
and legislative representation that parties must achieve before winning control 
over executive portfolios. In South Africa’s transitional consociational 
arrangements agreed in negotiations between the National Party and the African 
National Congress in 1992-3 political parties had to obtain 5 % of the vote before 
they could be guaranteed places in the cabinet, and 20 % of the vote, if they 
wanted to be guaranteed one of the two executive vice-presidential posts. In 
Northern Ireland, after its 1998 settlement, ten cabinet positions were available to 
political parties in proportion to their voting shares. Allocation took place 
according to a specific algorithm, the d’Hondt formula, which effectively Brendan O'Leary  Page 40 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  40
excludes parties that fail to achieve significant levels of electoral and legislative 
support. Four parties, with 22, 21, 20 and 18 per cent of the first preference vote 
respectively, took all of the ten cabinet positions, leaving a fifth of the electorate 
without a cabinet member representing their first-preference vote46. South 
African and Northern Irish illustrate how proportional allocation rules and 
threshold effects may lead to the democratic exclusion of smaller communities or 
the parties of smaller communities from access to the executive47.  
 
It is very rare, even in an extremely ethnically, religiously or culturally divided 
territory, for nearly all voters to vote cleanly for ethnic parties or candidates 
representing “their” communities. Some members of some minorities may vote 
for ethnic parties or candidates of other communities as proof of their 
integrationist or assimilationist intent.  Where a political system deliberately 
obliges voters to vote only within their own community for their own ethnic 
parties, then, and to that degree,  the system should be called corporately 
consociational. Separate electoral rolls for each ethnic community with a 
requirement that everyone register on one and only one roll illustrates this 
phenomenon. The British Raj”s organization of separate electoral rolls before 
independence is a well-known example of such a device. To obtain access to the 
community councils of independent Cyprus citizens had to opt to be on Greek 
Cypriot or Greek Turkish rolls. By contrast, in a liberal consociation all voters are 
on a common electoral register, and though they may vote for their own ethnic Brendan O'Leary  Page 41 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  41
parties, they are not required to do so.  The distinction between corporate and 
liberal consociational practice corresponds to Lijphart’s distinction between “pre-
determined” and “self-determined” group identity. Plainly the former 
arrangement is rightly criticized from the perspective of human development 
and liberal individualism. 
 
In competitive democracies there will, of course, be voters who vote for non-
ethnic, inter-ethnic and cross-ethnic parties. Where they are a minority in each 
significant community, and a minority overall, they may oppose but not 
successfully challenge a consociational regime. In some cases, such voters create 
a new community, a community of “others” who reject the available ethnic and 
party identifications, and they may either oppose consociational arrangements in 
defense of a new, transcendent, hybrid or non-ethnic identity, or, alternatively, 
they may start to bargain for a proportionate stake in the system. In other cases, 
voters who back non-ethnic, inter-ethnic and cross-ethnic parties are signaling 
integrationist or assimilationist dispositions. If such voters become majorities in 
each community then it is very likely that consociational arrangements will 
voluntarily dissolve. 
 
“Descriptive” representation of communities within otherwise formally non-
ethnic parties may lead to the creation of weakly consociational executives, i.e. 
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from each descriptively represented community. Large catchall, (or ideological 
or even confessional) parties that deliberately ensure that they have proportional 
quotas of candidates for parliamentary or ministerial office from all significant 
ethnic identities have clear intentions. They are trying both to appeal to voters as 
ethnic voters, by using consociational devices within their own organizations 
(e.g. proportionality and power-sharing), and to insure the party against possible 
withdrawals of support on ethnic criteria. Where such parties are successful and 
go on to form single party governments they are very unlikely to resemble 
complete or concurrent consociational executives, but they may well enjoy 
plurality support within each significant community. The federal Canadian 
Liberal party has been seen as a weak or descriptively consociational governing 
party because it usually alternates its party leadership between French and 
English speakers, and allots informal quotas of cabinet seats to Anglophones and 
Francophones, and because it sometimes enjoys plurality support among both 
Anglophones and Francophones48. Similar interpretations were advanced about 
the Indian National Congress party in its heyday, and are beginning to be 
suggested about the African National Congress in South Africa49.  Such 
governing parties may be classified as consociational by four criteria:   
(i) the extent to which they draw support from each major community of voters 
at plurality levels or above; 
(ii) the extent to which they are descriptively representative in the legislature and 
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(iii) their internal party organizational characteristics (i.e. the extent to which 
their internal governance follows consociational traits of executive power-
sharing, autonomy, proportionality and veto rights), and  
(iv) the extent to which they follow consociational practices to manage crises that 
have national, ethnic, linguistic or religious roots50.  
 
A last word on the democratic caliber of consociational executives.  Contrary to 
what some suggest,   presidencies, including  collective presidencies, have   
ranked at least as prominently as  variants of parliamentary premier-cabinet 
executives in “actual functioning consociational systems”. Consider e.g. 
Switzerland’s seven-person presidency (see Table 1.2). The snapshot evidence   
from table 1.2. suggests an interesting riposte to critics of consociation. 
Separation of power systems create formal mechanisms for accountability, and 
checks and balances,  of a different nature to those in parliamentary systems, and 
the critics (and proponents of consociation) have an overly strong and 
unexamined bias in favor of parliamentary systems. There is no reason why 
separation of powers systems with collective presidencies need preclude either 
opposition or accountability. What matters  from  the perspective of consociation 
is not whether a democratic regime is parliamentary or presidential, but whether 
it has cross-community power-sharing over executive functions and legislative 
agenda-setting (and to what degree: complete, concurrent or weak).  
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Presidential  Executives  Parliamentary  Executives 
1.  Directly elected president appoints 
persons from other communities to other 
key cabinet posts, and must appoint a 
consociational cabinet (Lebanon). 
2.  Directly elected collective executive 
presidency (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
3.  Indirectly dual presidency elected on a 
joint platform (Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). 
4.  Indirectly elected rotating single person 
presidency (segmental majority + 
informal concurrent consent) and two 
vice presidents, with a representative. 
cabinet (Region of Trentino-Alto Adigo, 
Province of Bolzano). 
5.  Indirectly elected collective presidency 
(Switzerland). 
6.  Indirectly appointed dual collective 
executive (European Union’s Council of 
Ministers and European Commission). 
7.  Strong premier appoints virtually 
representative cabinet (Canada) 
8.  Constrained premier co-exists with other 
party elites in a bi-communally 
representative coalition government 
(Belgium). 
9.  Dual premiership elected by a concurrent 
majority of the Assembly works with a 
cabinet allocated by the d’Hondt rule 
(Northern Ireland). 
 
Table 1.2. Empirical variations in executive designs  compatible with consociational principles.  
 
The foregoing discussion has qualified Lijphart’s views and that of his critics. 
Rather than requiring a grand coalition government, a democratic consociation 
necessarily has an executive in which there is significant cross-community 
representation and support, though the forms of representation may range from 
complete, through concurrent, to weak and virtual modes of support across the 
included communities. Consociations vary: 
i.  in the extent to which communities are included and  
ii.  in the degree of opposition to the governing coalition in the executive; 
iii.  in the degree to which they are liberal or corporate in their popular 
and assembly voting systems should distinguish democratic 
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Consociational arrangements may co-exist with non-ethnic and inter-ethnic 
parties. Lastly, consociational executives are as likely to be presidential as 
parliamentary – and consociational advocates need have no necessary bias 
against collective as opposed to single-person presidencies. 
 
D. The Scale and Scope  of Consociation. Consociational arrangements need not be 
comprehensive. They may be confined to distinct constitutional and policy 
sectors (in the domain of the politics of identity, recognition and constitutional 
change); they may be applied piecemeal where they are deemed necessary; they 
may apply to regions rather than entire states. They need not be mechanically 
applied. Nor are consociationalists peddlers of a panacea: the practices they 
commend are not everywhere likely to be either feasible or desirable.  
 
What of political systems that are partly consociational? At various junctures 
Lijphart has distinguished between semi-, quasi- and fully consociational 
arrangements, notably in his 1985 review of constitutional reform proposals in 
South Africa. The categories of semi- and quasi- as I read Lijphart appear to 
mean as follows: semi-consociations have autonomy and proportionality 
provisions, but lack executive power-sharing and veto-rights51; while quasi-
consociations, by contrast, combine elements of consociation (such as segmental 
participation, autonomy, and proportionality) but are weakened by dominant 
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exclusion of a segment or some segments from participation and autonomy, let 
alone proportionality, and de facto and de jure possession of veto-rights by a 
dominant minority)52. Even if the latter systems are claimed to be consociational 
they are not, and they are not democratic in elementary senses so the “quasi” 
label is unhelpful53. What Lijphart is pointing to here may better be captured by 
Donald Rothchild’s notion of “hegemonial exchange” – systems which combine 
elements of consociational and control methods54.  More terminological 
exactitude is possible.  Political systems are semi-consociational i f  t h e y  l a c k  
weak, concurrent or complete executive power-sharing,  but distinctly have the 
other three traits (autonomy, proportionality and veto-rights). On this 
categorization descriptive  consociational representation in the executive is semi-
consociational. Let us call political systems extensively consociational if they 
have executive power sharing, proportionality and autonomy, but lack full 
panoply of legal group veto rights. 
 
Consociation, its advocates declare, facilitates  justice, both procedural and social. 
Groups govern themselves in agreed domains. Distributions that follow 
proportional allocations may be and may be seen as fair: to each according to 
their numbers. In  a democratizing world that has an underlying moral appeal. 
There is also a correlation between numbers and potential power that makes 
such a mode of justice likely to be stable and legitimate. Consociationalists need 
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advantage, but one of their tacit arguments is that in some cases proportional 
allocations of public posts and resources will be regarded as fair distributions, 
and be more robust as a result.  
 
E. Rules of (i) Proportionality , (ii) Autonomy  and (iii) Veto Rights For  Inclusion 
 
E. (i) The feasibility of the idea of proportionality is not at issue in disputes over 
consociation, unlike the idea of grand coalitions, or as we shall see, the idea of  
non-territorial autonomy. In fully-fledged consociations the idea is that each 
significantly sized  community expects to be represented in political bodies in at 
least rough accordance with its demographic, or electoral share of the citizenry 
or population. The representation may be either descriptive, mirroring 
appropriately shares of groups, or substantive, with persons expected to act for 
the interests of their groups. There may, of course, be differences between the 
demographic and electoral shares of segments, and this may be a source of 
political controversy and fear. Proportionality can be partially applied, just to 
formal political institutions, or it can be applied to all common institutions in a 
state and indeed within civil society (excluding those in which each community  
has legitimate autonomy)55.   
 
Proportionality in political institutions may be achieved by electoral systems that 
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legislative bodies are composed so that parties are represented in proportion to 
their vote-shares56. The most commonly used are closed and open party list 
systems, and hybrid or mixed systems (which generally combine winner-take-all 
systems at the district level with compensatory proportional allocations of top-
up seats for parties). Table 1.3. lists some of the commonly used variants of 
electoral formulae. The list is confined to those formulae that may be deployed 
with party list and preferential systems of voting.  All achieve proportionality57.   
 
There cannot be any uncontroversial notion of proportionality, given that human 
beings do not come in fractions, that voters are very unlikely to divide their votes 
in neat easily convertible shares, and that each method for achieving 
proportionality “minimizes disproportionality according to the way it defines 
disproportionality”58. All proportionality systems necessarily require 
mathematical rules to deal with the necessary “rounding off” or “sequencing” of 
votes into seats. Each rule will have an explicit or tacit notion of what 
minimizing disproportionality involves. These rules or formulae, however, may 
be rank-ordered   as to whether, when bias is inevitable, they favor larger parties 
over smaller ones. From the most favorable for largest parties to the least favored 
the rank order is:  d’Hondt > STV (Droop) > LR-Droop > modified Sainte-Laguë 
> LR-Hare/Sainte-Laguë> equal proportions > Danish > Adams59. It is no 
surprise that d’Hondt or STV (Droop) are the commonly used formulae since 
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including within consociations. Table 1.4.  illustrates the use of Largest 
Remainders-Hare, Table 1.5.  the use of d’Hondt, and Table 1.6.  the use of the 
Droop quota.  In each case it is assumed that there are 500 voters with 5 seats to 
be awarded. The examples show that when different formulae are applied to the 
same vote distribution that d’Hondt will benefit the largest party, whereas in this 
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surplus votes from 
elected candidates and 
eliminated candidates. 
Table 1.3.  Various methods for proportionally allocating seats from votes. 
Source: adapted from Gallagher (1992: 470). 60    
Notes:  (i) v = votes; s = seats.  
 (ii) The equal proportions and the Adams methods can be used to determine the number of 
representatives for each district on the basis of population shares, but not to award seats to 
parties (since the initial divisor of 0 would give a seat to every party with 1 vote). 
 
The merits of using proportional representation systems to achieve proportional 
outcomes are obvious. Provided district magnitudes are not too small, and 
provided that there has not been significant gerrymandering of electoral 
districts61, then PR methods will produce outcomes that are usually seen as 
technically fair and consistent, even though each may each have distinct quirks 
of their own 62. Using such systems on a common roll also has the merit of 
enabling voters to decide whether they want to be represented by ethnic, trans-
ethnic or non-ethnic parties, i.e. voters enjoy self-determination. 
 
Table 1.4. Allocation of seats by Hare Largest remainders.  V = 500, Seats = 5. 
 
  Party A  Party B  Party C 
Quota = 100  300   140  60 
Quotas  3 (3)  1.4 (1)  .6  
Largest remainders  0  .4  .6 [1] 
Total 3  1  1 
 
Notes. The numbers in round brackets are seats awarded because of full quotas (v/s, = 100). The 
numbers in square brackets are seats awarded because of largest remainders. 
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1  300 (1)  140 (3)  60 
2 150  (2)  70   
3 100  (4)     
4 75  (5)     
Total 4  1  0 
Notes: The numbers in round brackets are seats awarded in sequential order of party presenting 
the highest (remaining) average. 
 
Table 1.6.  Allocation of seats by Droop quota. V = 500, Seats = 5. 
 
  Party A  Party B  Party C 
Quota = 83.3  300   140  60 
Quotas  3.6  (3)  1.68 (1)  .72  
Largest remainders  .6  .68  .72 [1] 
Total 3  1  1 
Notes: The numbers in round brackets are seats awarded because of full quotas (v/s+1) = 83.3).  
The numbers in square brackets are seats awarded because of largest remainders. 
 
In countries that use non-proportional electoral systems, such as winner-takes-all 
in single member districts, it may be possible to achieve proportional 
representation of communities, although it is more problematic to engineer63. 
Reserved seats may be kept for certain groups, e.g. the Maoris of New Zealand 
were reserved seats when New Zealand used plurality rule, at least initially 
broadly in line with their share of the citizenry, though it started to veer towards 
significant under-representation. The territorial concentration of communities 
may also facilitate proportional representation of legislators by ethnic, racial, 
religious or linguistic origin, though such results cannot be guaranteed. Thus the 
Canadian Liberal party runs Anglophone and Francophone candidates in 
appropriate ridings to try to ensure it will be internally representative in the 
Ottawa House of Commons.  After 1943 seats in the Lebanese chamber of 
deputies were divided in the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims, or 54.5: 46.5, Brendan O'Leary  Page 52 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  52
which supposedly reflected the shares of the two communities in the 1932 
census. Constituencies, of differing magnitude, were mandated to produce 
specific numbers of Christian and Muslim deputies to achieve this effect. In fact, 
the census of 1932 suggested a Christian: Muslim ratio of residents of 50: 49, and 
of 52: 47 among registered citizens. So the fixed ratio of 6: 5 was not very 
proportionate. Parity, or a ratio of 9:8, would have been more just. The ratio of 6: 
5 was also, by definition, inflexible – unless, of course, it could be agreed to vary 
the ratio in accordance with changing census returns. But in Lebanese politics it 
gradually became impossible to hold a fresh census. When Muslims, presumed 
to be expanding demographically64, demanded a fresh census, Christians 
demanded that the Lebanese diaspora, presumed disproportionately Christian, 
be included in any count. This led to a stalemate and was one of the grievances 
that provoked the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. 
 
Systems of reserved seats, or systems that rely on informal norms, we may 
conclude, are less likely to achieve proportionality smoothly than proportional 
electoral formulae. They may also involve pre-empting people’s identities and 
preferences, or adopting corporate (pre-determined) rather than liberal (self-
determined) principles of representation. Fixed quotas create obvious difficulties, 
a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  L e b a n o n .  T h a t  said, much the least controversial quota 
allocation is to give a community a guaranteed share of positions in the executive 
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By contrast, the over-representation of significant minorities automatically 
creates serious tensions, especially if the over-represented minority already has 
other protections or has historically been privileged65. In one famous example the 
Cypriot constitution of 1960 guaranteed 30 per cent of the seats in the Cypriot 
parliament, and 3 of the 10 seats in the Council of Ministers to Turkish 
Cypriots66, even though they comprised less than 20 per cent of the population. 
The following provision of the constitution regarding the executive of the 
Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina currently gives rise to predictable objections 
from the local majority of Bosniacs: “Section IV. B. Article 5: No fewer than one-
third of Ministerial positions shall be occupied by Croats”.  
 
Parity of representation among demographic unequals creates predictable 
objections among majority communities who, correctly, argue that 
proportionality is a different principle from parity. The new Belgian constitution 
requires that the Belgian federal cabinet be comprised of equal numbers of 
Flemish and French speakers, even though Flemish speakers are a clear 
demographic and electoral majority. The recent Northern Ireland executive 
(1999-2002) had equal numbers of unionist and nationalist ministers, but this was 
a result of parties agreeing that there should be ten ministries and the subsequent 
result of the application of the d’Hondt formula. With the same number of 
ministries and a different distribution of seats won among parties there would 
have been no guarantee of parity of representation.  Brendan O'Leary  Page 54 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  54
 
Lijphart has described both the over-representation of minorities and parity of 
representation of unequals, as “extensions of the proportionality rule”67, even 
though he also regards them as methods of “disproportional representation”. 
This is unfortunate linguistic acrobatics, but  it is plain that his intentions have 
been to counsel against over-representation of minorities. Disproportional 
representation may be conceived of as a method of minority protection, and may 
be demanded by minorities on various grounds, but such representation is 
legitimately criticized as departing from the norm of proportionality (to each 
according to their numbers) and therefore from consociational logic. The 
conjunction of over-representation or parity among unequals with minority veto 
rights (see below) creates obvious protests from majorities. Majorities may well 
accept veto rights on matters or national, ethnic, cultural or religious significance 
for minorities, but they do not appreciate why they additionally have to endure 
under-representation or parity when they comprise the largest community.  
 
The idea of proportionality also serves as a standard for the disbursement of 
public funds by a regional or sovereign consociation. Indeed departures from 
proportionality may occasion dissatisfaction, unless one community is 
demonstrably poorer than another. The Constitution of Cyprus of 1960 
guaranteed funding for the Turkish communal chamber at ¼1/4 of the sums to 
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comprised less than 1/5 of the population. Proportional allocation of public 
expenditure is relatively easy to achieve technically among groups that are 
sharply differentiated and relatively equal in endowments, though the politics of 
such allocation cannot be presumed to be unproblematic.  
   
Lastly, in consociations proportionality is used as a standard for the allocation of 
positions throughout the state or region, especially in its public (and sometimes 
in its private) sector. In 1958 in the Lebanon President Chehab proclaimed the 
introduction of the principle of strict parity between Christian and Muslim 
appointees to the civil service. This calmed communal relations though tensions 
remained because of Maronite “preserves”68 in the security sector; later, when 
Muslims were convinced of their increased numbers and educationally uplifted 
they started to demand the end of the quota and the proportionality principle. 
Examples of the use of proportionality rules or quotas to allocate administrative 
and judicial positions abound in the literature of national and ethnic conflict 
regulation: Northern Ireland, Canada, and Belgium are all regions or countries 
with rigorous fair employment laws, including the use of affirmative action, and 
in some cases quotas, to achieve proportionality in public life. The literature on 
affirmative action and preferential policies is now vast – so large that it is 
separately addressed in a different paper in this symposium.   
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E. (ii). Consociations share political power on matters agreed to be of common 
i.e. cross-community concern. They do so in executives and legislatures, and, in 
principle, may do so in judiciaries. In independent sovereign consociations key 
policies and positions in security institutions (the armed forces, intelligence 
organizations, and central policing services) and in economic institutions (such 
as central banks) are, however, very likely integrated69. Equally though,   
successful consociations are systems of self-rule which delegate decision-making 
or grant autonomy (self-government) to communities on matters that are deemed 
appropriate. Tacitly, consociations work with their own distinct principle of 
“subsidiarity”,  making it inappropriate to seek autonomy over what are matters 
of common concern, and equally inappropriate to try to make a matter of 
common concern what has been decreed to be within a community’s 
autonomous rights.  The core idea of autonomy from the perspective of 
minorities is “rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority’s 
exclusive concern”70. But the idea applies to all communities, including 
majorities that have autonomy. The idea of autonomy is easy to state in principle 
but its institutional and regulatory manifestations are complex and varied71.   
 
Autonomy is not the same as independence or sovereignty, and exists within 
constitutionalized (or statutory or normative) arrangements that  regulate the 
level of discretion enjoyed by the authorities with autonomy.  A standard 
contrast in types of autonomy differentiates territorial and non-territorial forms.  Brendan O'Leary  Page 57 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  57
Territorial autonomy arrangements can be organized in federations (state- or 
system-wide forms of territorial government), federacies (particular federalized 
arrangements between at least one governmental unit and the central 
government) and devolved governmental systems (within unitary states where 
the central government reserves full legal sovereignty). These are discussed at 
greater length below but Table 1.7. suggests  examples of how territorial 
autonomy and consociational arrangements may be  combined. The columns 
organize political systems by the nature of their executives, legislatures and 
constitutional amendment procedures, the rows organize systems by the nature 
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Table 1.7:  Possible combinations of territorial autonomy and consociational (executive and 
legislative) arrangements at the centre. 
 
A federation can be completely or concurrently consociational when all the 
significant communities enjoy territorial autonomy and a (proportionate or 
equal) share in the running of the federal government, and when the boundaries 
of concentrated communities  correspond with the territorial units of self-
government in the federation, and when the federation at the centre reflects the 
other consociational organizational principles of executive power-sharing, 
proportional representation of all segments. A federacy is consociational when 
the relevant region has constitutionally entrenched territorial autonomy and is 
internally organized along consociational lines. A consociational devolutionary 
regime is one in which territorial autonomy is enjoyed by one or more distinct 
regions at the revisable discretion of the central government, but the regional 
governance is internally organized along consociational lines. A confederation is 
consociational when its confederal institutions have either complete or 
concurrent executives that represent the member-states, and when the 
institutions additionally reflect proportionality and mutual veto practices72.  
 
“Non-territorial” autonomy seems  puzzling. Must not all powers or rights be 
exercised within a territory? Perhaps the “personality” or the “group” principle 
are better descriptions, notions sometimes  subsumed under the notion of 
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autonomy are distinctly consociational (because  territorial autonomy is often 
found in non-consociational systems).  
 
Under group autonomy members of communities  may exercise the relevant 
rights  wherever they reside or work in a state or region – irrespective of the 
specific territory within which they live or work. So, for example, they may 
publicly profess their religious beliefs and hold religious meetings in public no 
matter where they live. Under personal autonomy each person may opt to be 
recognized or to receive services in accordance with their group membership. So, 
for example, a person living in Brussels, Belgium, may opt to receive information 
about public services in either French or Flemish73. A modern example of 
autonomy is the provision of separate broadcasting networks for different 
linguistic users throughout the entirety of a state, especially if each network is 
run by its own community’s political institutions or civil society. Striking 
examples of corporate legal autonomy are the separate civil law and personal 
status arrangements of the ethno-religious communities of the Lebanon. India’s 
separate personal laws for its Muslim and Christian minorities are the world’s 
most significant examples of corporate legal autonomy. Less surprising  to the 
integrationist eye, but no less consociational, are the fully funded and separate 
educational systems of the Netherlands, Belgium and Northern Ireland.  
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The 1960 constitution of Cyprus contained very extensive provisions for both 
legal and administrative pluralism (see Insert below) that illustrate  autonomy in 
a strongly consociational regime. It created Greek and Turkish chambers with 
extensive powers of self-government over religious, cultural and educational 
laws and policies. Reading Articles 86, 87 and 2 may create the impression that 
these provisions were utterly   corporate in nature, albeit dually corporate, and 
strongly patriarchal (in that identity of origin was presumed to follow from the 
father). They were, however, tempered by some liberal provisions elsewhere in 
the constitution. Citizens were free to de-register and join other communities. 
The minor religious communities, the Armenians, Maronites and Latins, were 
guaranteed the continued enjoyment of the liberties and status they had under 
British rule. Members of these groups, as individuals, were guaranteed human 
rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and  
both as individuals and as groups, they enjoyed constitutional protection against 
discrimination. The constitution enabled the Armenians, the Maronites and the 
Latins, as groups, to choose to belong to either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish- 
Insert 1. Community Autonomy in the Constitution of Cyprus (1960)74. 
Article 86. The Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively shall elect from amongst their own members a 
Communal Chamber which shall have the competence expressly reserved for it under the provisions of this Constitution.  
Article 87. 1. The Communal Chambers shall, in relation to their respective Community, have competence to exercise 
within the limits of this Constitution and subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, legislative power solely with regard to the 
following matters:-  
(a) all religious matters;  (b) all educational, cultural and teaching matters;  (c) personal status;  (d) the composition and 
instances of courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters;  (e) in matters where the 
interests and institutions are of purely communal nature such as charitable and sporting foundations, bodies and 
associations created for the purpose of promoting the well-being of their respective Community; (f) imposition of 
personal taxes and fees on members of their respective Community in order to provide for their respective needs and for 
the needs of bodies and institutions under their control as in Article 88 provided; (g) in matters where subsidiary Brendan O'Leary  Page 61 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  61
legislation in the form of regulations or bye-laws within the framework of the laws relating to municipalities will be 
necessary to enable a Communal Chamber to promote the aims pursued by municipalities composed solely of members 
of its respective Community;  (h) in matters relating to the exercise of the authority of control of producers' and 
consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments and of supervision in their functions of municipalities consisting 
solely of their respective Community, vested in them by this Constitution:  
Provided that-  
(i) any communal law, regulation, bye-law or decision made or taken by a Communal Chamber under this sub-paragraph 
(h) shall directly or indirectly be contrary to or inconsistent with any by which producers' and consumers' co-operatives 
and credit establishments are governed or to which the municipalities subject,  
(ii) nothing in paragraph (i) of this proviso contained shall be construed as enabling the House of Representatives to 
legislate on any matter relating to the exercise of the authority vested in Communal Chamber under this sub-paragraph 
(h): 
(i) in such other matters as are expressly provided by this Constitution. 
2. Nothing in sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 of this Article contained shall be construed as in any way curtailing the 
power of the House of Representatives to impose, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, any personal 
taxes.  
3. Any law or decision of a Communal Chamber made or taken in exercise of the power vested in it under paragraph 1 of 
this Article shall not in any way contain anything contrary to the interests of the security of the Republic or the 
constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or which is against 
the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person. 
Article 2 
For the purposes of this Constitution: 
(1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is 
Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church;  
(2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is 
Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems;  
(3) citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, within three 
months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish 
Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious group and upon such option 
they shall be deemed to be members of such Community:  
Provided that any citizen of the Republic who belongs to such a religious group may choose not to abide by the option of 
such group and by a written and signed declaration submitted within one month of the date of such option to the 
appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers opt to belong 
to the Community other than that to which such group shall be deemed to belong:   
Provided further that if an option of such religious group is not accepted on the ground that its members are below the 
requisite number any member of such group may within one month of the date of the refusal of acceptance of such option 
opt in the aforesaid manner as an individual to which Community he would like to belong.  
For the purposes of this paragraph a " religious group " means a group of persons ordinarily resident in Cyprus 
professing the same religion and either belonging to the same rite or being subject to the same jurisdiction thereof the 
number of whom, on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, exceeds one thousand out of which at 
least five hundred become on such date citizens of the Republic;  
(4) a person who becomes a citizen of the Republic at any time after three months of the date of the coming into operation 
of this Constitution shall exercise the option provided in paragraph (3) of this Article within three months of the date of 
his so becoming a citizen;  
(5) a Greek or a Turkish citizen of the Republic who comes within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article 
may cease to belong to the Community of which he is a member and belong to the other Community upon -  
(a) a written and signed declaration by such citizen to the effect that he desires such change, submitted to the appropriate 
officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers;  
(b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community;  
(6) any individual or any religious group deemed to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community under the 
provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article may cease to belong to such Community and be deemed to belong to the other 
Community upon -  
(a) a written and signed declaration by such individual or religious group to the effect that such change is desired, 
submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal 
Chambers;  
(b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community; 
(7) (a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her husband belongs. (b) a male or female child under 
the age of twenty-one who is not married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father belongs, or, if the 
father is unknown and he or she has not been adopted, to the Community to which his or her mother belongs.  Brendan O'Leary  Page 62 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  62
Cypriot community. In the event of option, the members of the group enjoyed 
the same benefits as the other members of the relevant community. Any religious 
group that opted as a group to belong to one of the two communities had the 
right under the constitution to be represented in the communal chamber of the 
community for which it opted. Any religious group, in common with other 
bodies, had the right of recourse as a group to the supreme constitutional court. 
Last, the constitution provided for members of the smaller religious groups to 
enjoy no less extensive rights in respect of religious matters than they enjoyed in 
law before, and matters of personal status remained under their jurisdiction. 
 
These provisions of the Cypriot constitution demonstrate  the feasibility of the 
personal or corporate principles of autonomy. Principles like these, of course, are 
not without their difficulties. While ethnic, religious and linguistic associational 
life is unproblematic, modern states cannot dispense with common territorial 
jurisdiction, either within a state, or within a region. In some matters – the usual 
examples given are criminal or business law – a single code of behaviour and a 
single regime of sanctions will usually be sought and rational in at least some 
domains of public and private life, if only to avoid perverse incentives to 
manipulate identities. The idea of people changing their ethnic, religious or 
linguistic identity just to avoid criminal sanctions is not appealing.  Meaningful 
personal or corporate autonomy has one legal consequence. It  will necessarily 
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to regulate potentially conflicting territorial, corporate and personal principles. 
This, of course, returns  us to  the domain of many of the normative arguments 
about consociation, but what matters here is to establish  the coherence and 
feasibility of the idea of non-territorial autonomy, i.e. distinctively consociational 
autonomy. Distinctively consociational autonomy provides an administratively 
cogent way to provide autonomy to territorially dispersed communities and to 
different communities that are extensively geographically mixed, as has been 
demonstrated at various junctures in the histories of Belgium, Cyprus and 
Lebanon75. 
 
E. (iii). The last element in Lijphart’s definition of consociational institutional 
traits, mutual community veto rights, is partly implied by the existence of the 
other three. To the extent that there is cross-community executive power-sharing 
each segment has at least weak and perhaps vigorous protection against 
majoritarian executive discretion and legislative agenda-setting. To the extent 
that there is consociational autonomy, territorial or corporate or personal, then 
minorities who benefit from such autonomy can stop other minorities or 
majorities from exercising executive or legislative dominance over them within 
the relevant functions and spaces. Autonomy or delegation, to be meaningful, 
entails veto-capacities for the autonomous or delegated authorities. Lastly, to the 
extent that there is proportional representation of segments throughout the state Brendan O'Leary  Page 64 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  64
then the capacity of each group to block dominance by the others is enhanced – 
though not guaranteed.  
 
Nevertheless formal mutual veto rights may be sought and institutionalized to 
ensure the guaranteed mutual protection of minorities and majorities. This is a 
very strong form of political inclusion. Formal mutual veto rights may exist 
within the constitution. Within the executive collective presidents or dual 
premiers may share agenda-setting and agenda-blocking powers, and vice-
presidents may be granted veto-rights (Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Cyprus). 
Within the legislature the consent of all the affected segments may be required 
before constitutional change can take place – as in the treaty of Westphalia’s 
provisions for co-existence among Christians. This can take the form of requiring 
unanimity within the legislature, a concurrent majority within the legislature, a 
weighted or super-majority that ensures concurrent or weak cross-segmental 
support, as in the “cross-community consent provisions” of the 1998 agreement 
in Northern Ireland. Similar restrictions to standard majority rule in the 
legislature may apply to ordinary legislation if minorities have the right to 
petition that such matters be deemed of national, ethnic or communal 
significance. Within the judicial arrangements of a state or region courts may be 
charged with protecting group autonomy in bills of rights and charters that 
effectively place constitutional constraints on majorities that are equivalent to 
entrenched veto rights; ombudsmen may be given similar quasi-judicial roles. Brendan O'Leary  Page 65 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  65
 
Veto-rights create obvious difficulties for standard majoritarian democratic 
theory. Minority “tyrannies” may block change; deadlock, immobilism, or policy 
stagnation can flow from the deployment of vetoes by all groups; and minorities 
that over-use their veto rights may de-stabilize a consociational settlement76. That 
said, these difficulties should not be exaggerated. In consociational systems 
formal veto rights tend to apply in the domains of the politics of identity: in 
ethnic, religious or national domains, and not in every policy sector. In effect, in 
these domains groups have parity of power, rather than proportional power. 
They are likely to be attached to those provisions that make the state and the 
constitution multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-territorial, or 
multi-religious. 
 
Lijphart argues that mutual vetoes may be formal or informal77. If they are 
formal they are found within constitutions and institutional rules. Though 
Lijphart is right to point to informal elements in the political cultures of several 
countries that are akin to mutual veto rights language should not be stretched.  
Without overt, measurable constitutional impact such elements should not be 
counted as veto rights. A political system with cross-community executive 
power-sharing, autonomy for the segments, and proportionality rules is 
consociational, and no doubt will be buttressed by conventions that take these 
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segments in certain domains should be regarded as elements of more rigid 
consociations, and they should be rights as such: i.e. legally enforceable78.  
 
This extended commentary on the elements of consociation may now be 
summarized. It is important to distinguish democratic from authoritarian, and 
liberal (self-determined) from corporate (pre-determined) consociations. The 
latter are plainly much more compatible with liberal human developmentalism.  
In democratic consociations there must be executives, which enjoy cross-
community support: either from all significant communities in the electorate 
(complete), majorities within each included segment (concurrent), or from a 
plurality of included significant segments (weak or descriptive consociation). 
There must be recognizable forms of autonomy in cultural domains: in 
educational, linguistic, religious and sometimes personal law and policy-making. 
Autonomy may be territorial, corporate or personal. It is distinctively 
consociational when it is corporate or personal. There must be systematic use of 
proportionality formulae in executives, legislatures, and public appointments. 
These three traits (cross-community support for the executive power-holders, 
autonomy and proportionality) are necessary features of a fully-fledged 
consociation. They may entail, but do not mandate a fourth. In more rigid 
consociations there will be parity or veto rights. These are most likely to be found 
in constitutional provisions. 
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F. The Naturalness of Consociations and Explaining Them. Consociationalists observe 
that consociations occur without their urgings. They think of them as “natural” 
and creative political responses to a politics of antagonism, as  the outcomes of 
negotiated deals. Politicians, Lijphart has observed, invented consociational rules 
and institutions in the Netherlands in 1917, in Lebanon in 1943, in Malaysia in 
1958, and British politicians did so for Northern Ireland in 1972. We can add that 
they were re-invented by American diplomats to end the war in Bosnia 
Herzegovina at Dayton in 1995; by Lebanese and Northern Irish politicians with 
external prompting in 1989 and 1998 respectively; and by EU diplomats in 
promoting the Ohrid agreement between Macedonian Slavs and Macedonian 
Albanians. The UN and the EU between them recently sought to mediate a 
consociational and confederal settlement in Cyprus, albeit one so heavily 
weighted toward the concerns of Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) that they lost 
the possibility of support among a majority of Greek Cypriots. And it is not just 
politicians who re-invent consociational ideas. Jurists, constitutional designers 
and political theorists constantly do so. As do so-called ordinary people. Jurists 
in the Holy Roman Empire proposed consociational ideas; and consociational 
propositions were freshly minted by the Austro-Marxists, especially by Karl 
Renner. Within academic political theory, without a full appreciation of the 
history of their ideas, many contemporary multi-culturalists advance 
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(proportionality), and group rights (autonomy) are often advanced in packages 
to remedy the participatory defects in some contemporary democracies79.   
 
Much comparative political science has been devoted to explaining the genesis of 
consociation, though no consensus on the matter exists. Table 1.8.  identifies a n 
alphabet of 26 factors  proposed by multiple scholars as independent variables 
that might explain the development of consociational systems (some of which are 
mutually incompatible). They may be ordered by (a) the number and the divisions 
between groups (the demography and historical sociology of group relations); (b) 
the domestic political regime (and the relations of its elites and citizens); and (c) the 
external relations of the state (or region).   
 
This is not the place to review all these possible explanatory variables, or their 
respective salience.  But three comments on international elements in the 
explanations of consociations are necessary. First, consociational  arrangements  
are less likely to be found among great military powers, because they are 
reluctant to embrace consensual  decision-making and favor energetic 
discretionary executive power80. Such is now the  argument of those who want to 
create a vigorous apparatus for the foreign and security policy-making of the 
European Union. Second,  great powers are willing to impose on small powers  
 Factors  Independent  Variables 
The  Divisions  1. Numbers  a. No dominant community  
    b. A dual balance of power  
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    d. Not too many communities 
    e. Demographic equilibrium 
  2. History  f. Elite traditions of accommodation  
    g. Past violence and its costs promotes accommodative 
politics  
    h. Non-colonial relationships among communities 
    i. Absence of special homeland claims  
    j. Over-arching unifying identities, shared rather than rival 
nationalisms 
  3. Sociology  k. Internal cohesion among communities 
    l. Cross-cutting cleavages that weaken central axis of 
antagonism 
    m. Geographically heterogeneous groups  
   n. Distinct lines of cleavage (that increase community 
security) including geographical isolation 
    o. Approximate socio-economic equality of the communities 
The Political 
Regime 
4.  Political  culture  p. Publics disposed toward accommodation and power-
sharing 
    q. Elites that know one another (size – see below under v) 
and negotiate without too much constituency pressure  
    r. Adequate articulation of community interests 
    s. Secure and autonomous elites  - popular legitimacy of the 
governing elites  
 5.Political 
institutions 
t. Institutions facilitate complete, concurrent, weak or 
descriptively consociational executives 
    u. Systems of electoral and party law that create elite 
predominance or secure and accountable elites 
The external 
environment 
6. External position 
of the state or regime 
v. Small size – Elites that know one another  
w Small size – Easier governance 
    x. Shared external threats 
    y. Relatively low foreign policy load 
    z. External pressure and international norms 
 
Table 1. 9. Alphabet of variables hypothesized to increase the likelihood of consociation 
Variables (a) &  (n) are the most favorable conditions cf.  Lijphart;  (t) & (z) are my additions. 
 
consociational arrangements e.g. the USA and European powers used vigorous 
coercion and inducements to promote consociational settlements in Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Macedonia, and in the last century the European powers 
intervened to create autonomy and rights packages for Christian minorities 
within many of the provinces of the Ottoman empire – ones that they did not 
always apply to their own religious minorities. Similarly, the centers of sovereign 
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autonomy settlements in small regions without re-engineering their core states, 
e.g. Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy and South Tyrol.  Third, the 
direct and indirect effects of international norms matter in the genesis of 
consociations. The received understanding of the Westphalian system is that 
sovereign states were to leave  one another alone in their domestic cultural 
zones. Their sovereignty gave them the right coercively to assimilate or integrate 
minorities within their borders (on some interpretations sovereignty even 
included the right to commit domestic genocide).  
 
This standard reading of the Westphalian system has never been without 
challengers. The historic treaty protected some religious power-sharing. In the 
1920s (after the collapse of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Czarist empires) new 
European states recognized at Versailles signed minority rights treaties that in 
principle could be regulated by the League of Nations. The treaties bound them 
not to abuse their minorities and in some cases required them to develop semi-
consociational practices (notably in religious, educational and linguistic 
autonomy). The story was hardly a success,  and the United Nations was partly 
constructed in San Francisco in a deliberate rejection of these experiments. But 
the post de-colonization international law of self-determination,  and the politics 
of recognition of the post-communist successor states,  have seen a revival of 
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provided some external shield for minorities that advance consociational 
demands.   
 
Other indirect effects of international norms and interventions are also evident 
on consociational prospects. International proscriptions exist against genocide 
and expulsion. Norms of some significance  reward states that are democratic – 
and make discriminatory regimes potential pariahs (though these now often 
parade themselves as allies in the global war on terror). There are also 
proscriptions against coercive assimilation. There are strong dispositions in the 
international system against secession and hostile to partitions. The conjunction 
of all these norms leave international organizations and great powers when they 
intervene in national, ethnic, and communal conflicts confined to promoting one 
of three repertoires of conflict regulation:  
(i)  territorial autonomy and/or federacies and federations;  
(ii)  (ii) integration; and  
(iii)  (iii) consociation.  
In some scenarios to prescribe integration --- Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Iraq --- is to prescribe the partisan victory of one 
community over another. In short,  the normative prohibition, if not factual 
exclusion, of certain options sometimes create leverage in favor of consociational 
arrangements, perhaps especially  in small political systems or weakened states.  
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Emergent Cases. There are at least three current experiments in “complex 
consociations”, Northern Ireland, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Macedonia, that 
illustrate these tentative suggestions. (Cyprus might have been another had 
Turkey not over-negotiated and had the United Nations and the European Union 
managed the local politics with greater perspicacity). All three involve executive 
power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy and veto-rights; but they also involve 
international efforts to resolve national self-determination disputes, mediation, 
negotiation, arbitration and implementation of peace settlements, and cross-
border or confederal relationships (and sometimes institutions) for national 
minorities with their kin in other states. They are somewhat less frequent than 
the international promotion of standard territorial autonomy settlements but 
their presence in our times is suggestive. They specifically attempt to address 
national self-determination disputes between communities, i.e. where there is an 
opposition between at least some secessionists and some unionists (or 
federalists).  The settlements institutionally recognize more than one people, 
nation or society, and attempt to provide constitutional architecture within 
which they can co-exist.  They may involve defining the state as multi-national, 
recognizing national minorities as well as majorities, referendums to ratify such 
settlements in more than one jurisdiction, or mechanisms to trigger referendums. 
They involve peace processes – mechanisms, confidence-building measures and 
institutional and policy transformations to halt conflict and future violent 
recurrences.  They involve both the reform and the restructuring of security Brendan O'Leary  Page 73 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  73
systems, and measures intended to end secessionist (and anti-secessionist) 
paramilitarism, as well as new human rights protections. These involve at least 
one other conflict-regulating strategy or principle in their design. These three 
consociations are combined with territorial autonomy.  In Northern Ireland the 
region has autonomy from Westminster. The Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina 
has internal territorial autonomy for Bosniacs and Croats. Macedonia will have 
de facto territorial autonomy for Macedonian Albanians. These consociations 
have arbitration mechanisms for resolving disputes --- impartial courts, 
commissions, international judges, international commissions, 
intergovernmental conferences. They may have elements of integration --- 
citizenship equality provisions --- and, they may have mechanisms that enable 
the secession of the relevant unit of consociational governance, or, alternatively, 
a procedure for enabling the central state to “down-size”. Northern Ireland 
illustrates the point; by contrast, there is no such provision in the Dayton or 
Ohrid Agreements. A last element of complexity is international involvement in 
the making, ratification and maintenance of the relevant consociational or 
autonomy settlements. This may involve neighboring states, regional powers, 
great powers, regional organizations (e.g. the OSCE or the EU), or international 
organizations (e.g. the UN), in organizing and monitoring cease-fires, in 
providing good offices for the making of settlements, in designing 
implementation arrangements, and providing default mechanisms to arbitrate 
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incorporation of international human and minority rights standards does not 
necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state. Institutionalized cross-border 
co-operation and the formation of bodies with executive powers in more than 
one formally sovereign jurisdiction, by contrast, entail at least a pooling if not 
necessarily a diminution of sovereignty. High commissioners appointed by great 
powers may be  indistinguishable from the prefects of protectorates (or those of 
colonial overlords).  
 
Summary.  The rival moral and political evaluations of consociation are unlikely 
to be immediately  resolved; and are not amenable to decisive confirmation or 
falsification by empirical evidence. They reflect different philosophies and 
factual appraisals. Anti-consociationalists fear that consociation will bring back 
racism, fundamentalism and patriarchy, whereas consociationalists fear that 
integrationists will provoke avoidable wars and are biased towards the interests, 
identities and ideas of dominant communities.   The intensity of this debate 
attests to the influence of consociational thought. The test of concepts, 
taxonomies and theories in the social and legal sciences is twofold: i.e.  whether 
they serve worthwhile explanatory or normative purposes.  The claim here  is 
that exponents of consociation, when their case is put carefully, can rebut the 
wilder charges made against their moral and political positions. Consociations, 
simple or complex,  are certainly difficult to love and celebrate – even if their 
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after all,  usually cold bargains, even if they may be tempered by political 
imagination. Ardent secessionists and uncompromising unionists should be 
counseled that their efforts may land them with these systems if they fail to win 
on the battlefield. In explaining  consociations significant  preliminary work has 
been done, but a comprehensive comparative historical analysis of consociational 
settlements and their outcomes remains to be completed.  
 
5.  Federal Arrangements 
Federal principles of inclusion, like those of consociation,  combine both shared 
rule and self-rule81. Federal political systems encompass a range of possible 
political organizations that reflect this philosophy: including confederations, 
federations, certain kinds of unions, federacies, associated states, leagues and 
cross-border functional authorities.  Federations are a very specific federal 
political system, arguably first unambiguously invented in 1787 in the city of 
Philadelphia82. And, like consociations federations can be built around the idea 
of including multiple peoples, creating a multi-society political system83, though  
it is vitally important to distinguish such multi-society or multi-national or pluri-
national federations from national or integrationist federations. The arguments 
below  distinguish national from multi-national federations, and evaluate their 
merits for achieving inclusion. Lastly  they   elaborate briefly on the less well-
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drawing upon my own thoughts84, and some unpublished work by David 
Rezvani85. 
 
In a genuine federation at least two governmental units, the federal and the 
regional, enjoy constitutionally separate competencies – although they may have 
concurrent or shared powers. Both the federal and regional governmental units 
are empowered directly to deal with their citizens – which differentiates most 
confederations from federations – and in a democratic federation citizens directly 
elect at least some components of both the federal and regional governments. 
Federations are “covenantal”, the authority of each government is derived from 
the constitution, and not from another government86. In authentic federations the 
federal government cannot unilaterally alter the horizontal division of powers: 
constitutional change affecting the division of competencies requires consent 
from both tiers of government. Therefore federations automatically require a 
written, codified constitution, and normally require a federal supreme court, 
charged with upholding the constitution and  umpiring differences between the 
governmental tiers. They also usually involve a bicameral legislature – a chamber 
of the citizens as a whole, and a second chamber that represents the regions.  
 
Federations vary extensively; first, in the extent to which they are “majoritarian”. 
All federations place some constraints on the powers of federation-wide 
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example, allow equal representation to each of their regions in the Senate, 
generating massive over-representation for small units such as Rhode Island or 
Tasmania. A majoritarian federation concentrates political power at the federal 
level, and facilitates executive and legislative dominance either by a popularly 
endorsed executive president, or by a single-party prime minister and cabinet. A 
federation is not majoritarian to the extent that it has inclusive executive power-
sharing arrangements in the federal tier of government; institutionalizes   
proportional principles of representation and allocation of public posts and 
resources; and has mechanisms,  such as the separation of powers, bills of rights, 
monetary institutions and courts,  that are insulated from the immediate power 
of a federal governing majority. On this design choice, Arabs  and Kurds in 
contemporary Iraq would be well-advised to avoid a strongly majoritarian 
federation.  Kurds have been an enduring  minority in Iraq and, judging by the 
historical record,  would be long-run losers from the creation of a strongly 
majoritarian federation – in which either an Arab or a Shi`a majority might 
threaten their national, linguistic and cultural identities, as well as their regional 
and economic interests. Sunni Iraqis too have an interest in constraining the 
power of a potential federal majority that might be inimical to their religious and 
other interests. Shi‘a may be the most tempted by a majoritarian political system, 
but they may be less homogeneous than some of them hope and others fear – 
given differences among  them in religiosity, and dispositions towards Iran and 
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the  greater the likelihood that they will generate a coalition of minorities against 
them. 
 
Federations, secondly, vary significantly in the distribution of powers within the 
federal government. Some create very powerful second chambers. The US Senate 
is arguably more powerful than the House of Representatives because of its 
special powers over nominations to public office, and over treaty-making. Other 
second chambers, such as those in Canada, India and Belgium, are very weak89. 
Some have separately elected executives; some have executives chosen by the 
federal first chamber; and there are both single person and collective executives. 
Thirdly, federations differ in the distribution of competencies between the 
federal and regional governments. In some federations  the powers of the federal 
government are constitutionally circumscribed and delimited; in others the 
regional governments have their capacities specified and delimited. In the 
German model the federal government makes broad policy and law while 
administration and implementation are in the hands of Länder governments, 
empowering both tiers with distinct enabling and blocking powers (the 
European Union appears to be federalizing along German lines). In all 
federations the constitutional division of competencies (even as interpreted by 
the courts) may not be an accurate guide to the policy-making autonomy and 
discretion held by the separate tiers. The superior financial and political 
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capacities – as in the USA where the federal government’s pre-eminence is now 
established90.  
 
But  whatever the distribution of competencies between federal government and 
and its  regions,  the critical choice  on political inclusion is whether the 
federation is to be mono-national (or integrationist) or multi-national. Mono-
national or national federations aspire to national homogeneity: to eliminate 
internal national - and perhaps also, ethnic - differences from  lasting political 
salience. The goal of national federations is nation-building. The USA is the   
paradigmatic example of a national federation. The Latin American federations 
of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, at various junctures in their history 
have adopted this US model. Germany, Austria, Australia, Malaysia and the 
United Arab Emirates are also national federations. National federalists think 
one nation and one federation can be combined successfully. The earliest-
federalists in what became the Netherlands, the German-speaking Swiss lands, 
the USA and the Second German Reich were stepping-stone nationalists: the 
prime function of federation was “to unite people living in different political 
units, who nevertheless shared a common language and culture”91. They 
maintained  federation was necessary to provide a united defense and external 
relations – tasks that confederations and leagues were less well-equipped to 
perform92.  
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American and American-educated intellectuals, political scientists and 
constitutional lawyers,  often propose national federations to manage 
heterogeneous post-colonial and post-communist societies. Indeed,  they have a 
distinct animus against multi-national federations, which they regard as divisive 
and likely to collapse through secession. As the USA expanded southwestwards 
from its original largely homogenous citizenry of the 13 founding colonies – a 
citizenry which, of course, excluded African slaves and native Americans – no 
new territory received statehood unless minorities were outnumbered by White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants93. Sometimes the technique deployed was to 
gerrymander state boundaries to ensure that Hispanic or Indians were 
outnumbered, as in Florida. At other times statehood was delayed until the 
region’s long-standing residents could be swamped. America’s nation-builders 
were even cautious about immigrant groups concentrating too much in given 
territorial locales, lest this give rise to ethnically based demands for self-
government. Grants of public land were denied to ethnic groups per se to 
promote their dispersal: William Penn dissuaded Welsh immigrants from setting 
up their own self-governing barony in Pennsylvania94. This is why the US 
federation, in the words of one of its most distinguished analysts, shows “little 
coincidence between ethnic groups and state boundaries.”95 It would be more 
precise  to say that the sole coincidence is between white majorities and state 
boundaries, and that that is no coincidence. National federation, as a strategy of 
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the famous melting pot of what Milton Gordon described as “Anglo 
conformity”96. Celebration of the homogeneity of the founding people of the 
federation was evident in the now sacramental The Federalist Papers. In the words 
of John Jay: “Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to 
one united people – a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the 
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of 
government, very similar in their manners and their customs, and who, by their 
joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and 
bloody war, have nobly established liberty and independence”97. 
 
This quick assessment of the “historical starting point” and development of the 
USA  suggests  the inappropriateness of American  national federation as a 
model for many multi-national, multi-religious and multi-lingual territories, 
where  there is no sufficiently homogeneous founding people,  blessed by 
Providence or not. In such cases to  create regions in which one culture or one 
people is pre-eminent, the historical practice of the USA, is a recipe for conflict, 
especially in a non-immigrant state. We may take contemporary Iraq as an 
example for analysis. It takes little historical knowledge to argue that no one 
could plausibly advance John Jay’s arguments during the making of Iraq’s new 
constitution. Iraq may be contiguously connected on maps, but it has not had a 
united people, i.e. a people who think of themselves as descended from the same 
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Islam has, after all,  divided them as much as it has united them. They neither 
flow from a common stock, nor are they united by a common immigrant or 
assimilationist experience. They have not “by their joint counsels, arms and 
efforts” just fought a combined war of national liberation. To the contrary: only 
the Kurds fought with the Allies; the Shi`a were reluctant to rise given their 
previous abandonment by the 1991 coalition  to Saddam Hussein’s mercies; and 
some Sunni Ba’athists to this day are fighting the Allied occupation. It is true that 
m a n y  I r a q i  A r a b s ,  b e  t h e y  S u n n i  o r  S h i ’ i t e ,   f o u g h t  s i d e  b y  s i d e  i n  S a d d a m  
Hussein’s long and bloody war with Iran, and that that war proved that for most 
of them ethnicity trumped religiosity, but some Shi`a did enroll with Iran, and 
most  were at the front  through conscription rather than by choice. Notoriously 
during  that war Saddam organized genocidal massacres of Kurds, who were not 
in any sense “his own people”98; just as he would later engage in repressive 
massacres of largely Shi’ite Marsh Arabs. 
 
It is, of course, feasible to have many regions in Ireaq in which Shi`a would be 
the local majority. Indeed it is probably not feasible  to design contiguous 
regional boundaries that would not make the  Shi`a dominant in many of them. 
But, it would be extraordinarily difficult, and divisive to devise regional 
boundaries to prevent Kurdish or Sunni communities from becoming regional 
majorities anywhere in Iraq. In the case of the Kurds such a strategy would 
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the addition of significant non-Kurdish population and territories into each new 
unit. Such design principles would return the Kurds to armed conflict with the 
rest of Iraq. No nationally mobilized people in recent history has peacefully 
acquiesced in the partition of its homeland. As for Sunni Arabs, one reason why 
the Ba’athists remain partly embedded among them is the widespread fear 
among them that Shi`a will create a majoritarian democracy that they will see as 
a dictatorship. In short, no better plan for provocative conflict could be devised 
than designing the territorial boundaries of the new Iraqi federation to prevent 
either Kurds or Sunnis from having regions in which they are the 
demographically and electorally dominant group. Regrettably, these elementary 
considerations are overlooked by those who argue that a new Iraqi federation 
should be built around the eighteen provinces of Ba’athist Iraq99. One American 
political scientist has argued that the regional boundaries should be drawn to 
prevent any of the three major communities, Kurds, Sunni Arabs or Shi’ite Arabs 
from having local majority control100. There is nothing wrong in principle with 
advocating this design, but it has no prospect of success in Iraq. To design or re-
draw regional borders along these lines would require the services of the armed 
forces of the Allied occupiers or future UN forces. It is also difficult to see how 
this thinking could even be regarded as feasible before a reliable new census; and 
if it were known that the census would inform the drawing of such new borders 
that in turn might create perverse incentives to expel exposed minorities.  
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Advocates of multi-national federations have a different conception of how to 
achieve inclusion. They eschew assimilation, and embrace deeper pluralist 
thought. Like consociationalists they seek “to unite people who seek the 
advantages of a common political unit, but differ markedly in descent, language 
and culture”101. They seek to recognize, express and institutionalize at least two 
national cultures, on a durable, and often on a permanent basis. Multi-national 
federations involve the maintenance of two or more nations. Their exponents  
believe it is possible for the citizens of such federations to have dual or multiple 
loyalties, e.g. a patriotic attachment to the federation and a nationalist 
attachment to their regional homeland (see Professor Stepan’s contribution to 
this symposium). They believe it is wrong to assume a priori either that multi-
national federations will lead to the abuse of the rights, interests and identities of 
regional minorities, or that they will necessarily make secessionists victorious.  
Multi-national federalism has long been advocated within both liberal and 
Marxist traditions, and has a significant following within the Anglophone 
academy102, including both those who see federations as devices to hold peoples 
together as well as those who emphasize the merits of territorial autonomy for 
historic national minorities. Multi-national federations are workable. Switzerland 
and Canada are among the world’s oldest states – they have lasted in 
recognizably similar forms since 1848 and 1867 respectively. But, while multi-
national federations have their enthusiasts, no one can deny that in the twentieth 
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e t h n i c  f e d e r a t i o n s  h a v e  b r o k e n  d o w n  o r  h a v e  f a i l e d  t o  r e m a i n  d e m o c r a t i c  
throughout the communist and post-communist world (Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR; and Ethiopia “lost” Eritrea); and they have also 
broken down in much of the postcolonial world, in sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia and the Caribbean104. In the Arabic world the United Arab Emirates is the 
sole surviving postcolonial federation – and it is a national federation, and 
hardly a model democracy.  
 
The breakdowns of these federations do, however, have elements in common 
which the architects of the new Iraq would be well advised to bear in mind. John 
McGarry and I highlight five key elements that have facilitated the breakdown of 
multi-national federations105: 
1.  Coercion: They were usually forced together rather than being the outcome 
of voluntary agreements, e.g. the constituent republics of the Soviet 
Union.  
2.  Authoritarianism: They were not democratic for much of their histories, 
and when many such federations democratized that created the 
institutions and opportunities for secessions to occur, e.g. Bangladesh’s 
secession from Pakistan; e.g. Slovenia and Croatia’s secessions from 
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3.  Maltreatment of smaller nations: They failed to resolve tensions between the 
largest or the historically dominant nation and smaller nations, e.g. 
between Malays and Chinese. 
4.  Distributive conflicts: They failed to develop or maintain economic 
distributive and redistributive formulae regarding economic policy, 
taxation, revenue-sharing, and public expenditures, that were widely 
regarded as fair, e.g. Czechoslovakia. 
5.  Centralizing coups, putsches or maneuvers: Breakdown was often preceded 
by authoritarian attempts to centralize the federations, e.g. the conduct of 
Serbian politicians in Yugoslavia. 
 
The implications for Iraq (and other possible postcolonial and postconflict sites) 
of this rapid inspection of the failure of multi-national federations are 
straightforward. The conditions for a successful federation include the following.  
One: The federation must be a voluntary pact, and not regarded as an American 
or UN imposition. The federation must be ratified by its respective and 
prospective units –e.g Kurds must have a referendum in their own unit to 
endorse any freely negotiated constitution. A foundational act of co-operation is 
more likely to promote future traditions of accommodation. Two: the federation 
must be democratic, with the full repertoire of liberal democratic institutions, 
universal adult suffrage, competitive elections, freedom for political parties and 
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protections, and a free media. Three: constructive relations based on mutual 
recognition must be built between the three largest national and religious 
communities, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi’ite Arabs, as well as the smaller minorities 
of Turkomen, Christians and others. Four: robust and adequate agreements have 
to be built over the sharing of Iraq’s natural resources. Lastly, there must be 
significant constitutional checks – and preferably some international arbitration 
mechanisms – that would inhibit future efforts to centralize the federation, e.g. 
there needs to be significant default mechanisms to protect Kurds should a 
governing coalition in the rest of Iraq in the future try to undermine Kurdistan’s 
newly won constitutional status.  
 
Inspecting the failures of twentieth century multi-national federations is not, of 
course, the only way to think about these matters. The major surviving federal 
multi-national democracies, notably Belgium, Canada, India and Switzerland, 
have had histories, institutions and practices that may separately or jointly 
explain their relative robustness: 
1.  Multi-national federations may well benefit from having one large group, 
a Staatsvolk. All other things being equal a Staatsvolk can feel secure and 
live with what it will regard as the price of multi-national federation. It 
has both the practical power to resist secession, and the capacity to be 
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2.  Conversely, multi-national federations that lack a Staatsvolk, if they are to 
survive as democratic and durable entities, must have cross-community 
power-sharing practices in the federal government, i.e. consociational 
practices.  These practices must minimally encompass the interests of all 
the national, ethnic and ethno-religious communities with the capacity to 
breakaway. Neither the presence of a Staatsvolk, condition one, nor cross-
community power-sharing practices in the federal government, condition 
two, are sufficient to ensure the survival of a democratic multi-national 
federation but judging by the record of the twentieth century the presence 
of one of these conditions is a necessary condition of enduring 
federations106.  
3.  Federations are more likely to be stabilized if they have non-
interventionist neighbors who do not seek to play major roles in the lives 
of their cross-border co-ethnics or co-religionists.  
4.  An authentic multi-national federation will be democratic. Democratic 
arrangements allow the representatives of national, ethnic and ethno-
religious communities to engage in dialogue and open bargaining, which 
facilitates the development of political co-operation. Liberal democratic 
arrangements that protect individual rights and collective organization in 
civil society serve to check systematic transgressions against such 
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respective communities feel secure – and in consequence may facilitate the 
emergence of inter-ethnic and inter-religious co-operation.  
5.  Prosperous and fair federations are more likely to endure than those that 
are not. One should not exaggerate the power of materialism in politics.  It 
would be wrong, for example, to insist that prosperity is a necessary 
starting condition of the success of multi-national federation – 
Switzerland, Canada and India did not start rich, and India is far from 
being rich. But, federations that over time facilitate increasing per capita 
prosperity ceteris paribus have better prospects of success.  
 
The application of these arguments to the future of Iraq may now be briefly 
sketched. First, Iraq has a potential Staatsvolk, Shi`a Arabs, who might be 
demographically reinforced by the return of deportees, exiles, and refugees. But, 
several factors tell against the materialization of this prospect. They have not 
been the historically dominant people in the state; and it is unlikely that they will 
be politically homogeneous – provided they get a fair stake in the new order. 
They have religious and secular cleavages among them; they have intra-religious 
cleavages; and they have class differences. Vigorous Shi`a majoritarianism would 
guarantee a prolonged Sunni Arab resistance that would not just be political. 
And Sunni Arabs, by virtue of their past dominance, have greater resources than 
their potential rivals. Second, if there is no  compelling evidence that the Shi‘a 
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centre as well as autonomy within the regions will be necessary to preserve  the 
federation. Federalism, after all, involves both “shared rule” as well as “self-
rule”. The exclusion of national, ethnic or religious communities from 
representation and power at the center is a sure recipe for conflict and 
secessionism. Durably democratic multi-national federations, Canada, 
Switzerland, Belgium,  have had consociational or power-sharing practices in 
their federal governments: cross-community executive power-sharing, 
proportional representation of groups throughout the state sector (including the 
military, police and judiciary) and formal or informal minority veto-rights. And, 
it has been argued that India has been at its most stable when its executive has 
been descriptively inclusive of that state’s diverse religions and linguistic 
communities107. This evidence strongly suggests that Iraq needs an executive that 
is cross-community and cross-regional in character. The nine-member collective 
presidency of the Governing Council is a good portent of sensible future 
compromises on the construction of a future federal executive. A five-person 
collective presidency comprised of representatives from five regions – a 
Kurdistan region, a Sunni dominated region, Baghdad and two Shi`a dominated 
regions – would necessarily have a cross-regional and cross-community 
character – and would not  require formal “set-asides”, the bugbear of many 
western constitutionalists. Given many Iraqis’ interest in avoiding too powerful a 
central government,  a collective presidency commends itself as the best means 
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military, police and judges are representative of Iraq’s diversity would cement 
the necessary political accommodation. Third, the external conditions for the 
success of federation in Iraq are not difficult to spell out: Turkey, Syria,  Iran and 
Saudi Arabia will have to keep out of their neighbor’s territory, and avoid 
sponsoring paramilitary organizations of any kind. The fourth and fifth 
conditions of long-run success in multi-national federations, democratization and 
economic prosperity cannot be assured in advance, but nothing in Iraq’s cultures 
or communities’ talents need necessarily prevent them.  
 
This extended treatment of one possible example stresses the possibility of a 
democratic federation in Iraq, but if,  and only if,  that  future Iraqi federation  is 
bi-national, multi-ethnic, tolerantly multi-religious, and multi-regional. Bi-national,  
because there are two nationally mobilized and linguistically distinctive 
collective communities, Kurds and Arabs. Multi-ethnic,  because there are a 
range of other ethnic communities, notably Turkomen, who will need to have 
institutional recognition and protections, both at the federal and regional levels. 
Multi-religious, both to manage the Shi`a and Sunni divide, their internal 
divisions, and the non-Muslim religions, as well as those who have no religion. 
This  will require collective compromises on personal law, and a separation of 
the state from any distinctive religion, though it need not preclude the 
constitution from recognizing Islam as the major religion of the peoples of Iraq – 
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funding of education might also  resolve many possible religious sources of 
conflict.  
 
We may also treat the  notion of ‘federacy’, also raised in Professor Stepan’s 
contribution through the same example. Many Kurds have been 
programmatically committed,  for a long time, to a confederal or federal Iraq. 
Kurds  have a long tradition of seeking territorial autonomy and having 
autonomy arrangements, territorial or cultural,  betrayed by governments in 
Baghdad (or London or in other capitals in the world). Kurds cannot, of course,  
impose a federation on their prospective negotiating partners. They can only 
negotiate with those willing to make a deal with them. Kurds, however, have 
three immediate political priorities: 
1. To promote a bi-national, multi-ethnic, tolerantly multi-religious and 
multi-regional Iraqi federation with a significantly sized Kurdistan as one 
of its units, and within that unit they should deepen and extend their own 
evolving democratic institutions and, as they intend,  provide cultural 
rights for Turkomen that Turks have not given to Kurds in Turkey. Kurds 
seek a whole Kurdistan as a region of an Iraqi federation, and power-
sharing in the federal government, and full cultural rights for Kurds living 
outside Kurdistan.  
2. To insist that any negotiated constitution be ratified by the people of 
Kurdistan, as well as the rest of Iraq. Brendan O'Leary  Page 93 first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  93
3. To insist on default mechanisms that would protect Kurdistan in the 
event of breaches of any new Iraqi constitution. 
 
But Kurds have to consider their options if the rest of Iraq chooses not to  accept 
any mutually agreeable model of a bi-national, multi-regional federation. One 
option would be for  Kurds to insist on  a distinctive ‘federacy’ agreement. They 
can say that they will accept  the rest of Iraq choosing to be unitary,  or indeed 
choosing to  be a centralized US-style national federation, provided that Kurds 
themselves have a ‘federacy’. A federacy is a federal arrangement that is not a 
part of a system-wide federation; it creates a semi-sovereign territory different in 
its institutions and constitutional competencies from the rest of the state; it 
creates a division of powers between the federacy and the central government 
that is constitutionally entrenched,  that  cannot be unilaterally altered by either 
side, and which has established arbitration mechanisms, domestic or 
international,  to deal with difficulties that might arise between the federacy and 
the central government. Federacy is autonomy that is not devolution; it is not a 
revocable gift from the central government; it is domestically constitutionally 
entrenched so that the federacy can veto any changes in its status or powers; and, 
ideally, its status and powers are  internationally protected in a treaty. In short, 
while Kurds have no right to impose a federation on the rest of Iraq, they have 
every  right to insist on federacy arrangements for Kurdistan as one means 
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they would probably seek looser power-sharing arrangements in the central 
government, especially in foreign relations,  while seeking  to protect the cultural 
and human rights of Kurds outside Kurdistan. 
 
Summary. Multi-national federations, federacies and consociations, and 
permutations of all three systems, are ways of achieving inclusive but non-
homogenizing political institutions capable of managing national, ethnic, 
linguistic and religious diversity. There are working examples of each. The 
model of the homogenizing nation-state not only need not be followed, it is often 
a recipe for protracted conflict. This is not to say that maintaining a state must be 
the  sine qua non of political practice: sometimes national self-determination 
exercised through secession is the best remedy for historic ill-treatment and a 
fresh start. But unionists and federalists determined to maintain their states 
would be well advised to look at multi-national federations, federacies and 
consociations as feasible and principled alternatives to assimilationist or 
integrationist nation-states.  
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Appendix 1.  Electoral Arrangements and Inclusion. 
 
Electoral systems achieve greater inclusivity and assist human development 
more significantly the greater the ease with which voter-registration can be 
accomplished, the greater the transparency, uniformity and integrity of electoral 
administration and the counting process, the greater the personal security of 
voters, the greater the degree of impartial or judicial as opposed to party-political  
determination of district boundaries, the greater the degree of openness and 
competitiveness of media outlets, and the greater the transparency and equality 
of funding of parties and candidates. These propositions apply to all electoral 
arrangements.  
 
The discussion above has identified four broad political strategies that encourage 
specific models of inclusion: assimilation, integration, consociation, and 
federalized models of territorial autonomy. The first two are attached to nation-
state models of homogenization; the latter two attempt to build and expand dual 
identifications among the citizens of the relevant peoples. Permutations of these 
strategies are, of course, possible, but are not treated here. Each of the four 
strategies fits better with certain electoral designs – though this comment 
requires more extensive  qualification that can  be provided  here.  
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Assimilationist and integrationist democrats prefer state-wide political parties, 
differentiated by programmatic, left-right divisions, or, relatedly, appeals based 
on divisible, tradable, and material interests. For these reasons they are disposed 
toward electoral systems that promote two-party or two bloc systems, and that 
are likely, in parliamentary systems to generate a single-party – or at least single 
bloc – government, facing a single-party (or at least single bloc) opposition. They 
believe the best systems  generate pressures for parties to support median or 
moderate voters. They likewise favor the direct election of presidents. 
Assimilationists unambiguously support winner-take all electoral systems – in 
the form of plurality rule in single-member districts (the historic British and 
American norm) or double-ballot systems (the historic French norm). They may 
support preferential-majority systems in single-member districts (the alternative 
vote), that is used to elect the lower chamber of the Australian federal 
parliament. National federalists are generally integrationists with assimilationist 
ambitions, and for these reasons they too tend to favor majoritarian electoral 
systems. Multi-national federalists, by contrast, may favor majoritarian systems 
within  regions – enabling each region to have self-government – but may prefer 
more proportional (in the house) or parity (in the senate) systems at the level of 
the federal legislature. 
 
Winner-takes all and majoritarian systems have obvious drawbacks in deeply 
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Such systems can reinforce existing divisions creating tyrannies of the majority 
(or of the plurality). Conflict in Sri Lanka stems from the 1950s where 
competition within the dominant Sinhala bloc encouraged linguistic (Sinhala-
only) extremism,  and where Tamil votes did not count in the way they might 
have  (partly because plantation Tamils at that time were disenfranchised). In 
Northern Ireland between 1920 and 1972 the dominant Ulster Unionist Party was 
able to make all region-wide elections referendums on the national question, 
thereby unifying the unionist bloc against Irish nationalists. In the deep South of 
the USA, plurality rule, combined with franchise restrictions and 
gerrymandering,  led to one-party governments dominated by southern whites 
for a century. In fairness, however, it has to be said that these are not necessary 
results of these electoral systems (and be it noted that changes of such electoral 
systems towards more proportional ones may not immediately improve inter-
group relations). Throughout their democratic histories Canada and India, both 
multi-lingual federations,  have had plurality rule in single-member districts for 
federal and regional elections, and have produced federation-wide political 
parties capable of appealing across ethnic and linguistic blocs and being broadly 
representative. But, their systems are vulnerable to take-over by plurality-
supported hard-liners from the dominant Anglophone and Hindu communities 
respectively.  
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Certain integrationists commend the merits of two means of making the votes of 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities count. One recommends distributive 
requirements which require successful candidates for office – or parties - to 
achieve minimum levels of support across districts (or a proportion of districts) 
over an entire state or region. The logic is to ensure that candidates and parties 
have incentives to win broad-based support. The hope is that will ensure that 
successful candidates and parties have incentives to appeal to minority voters. 
Such systems, however, have certain drawbacks: they may not specify what 
happens if no parties or candidates achieve the requisite requirements (i.e. they 
fail guarantee clear outcomes); and a candidate might defeat another candidate 
even though the “winner” has  a lower share of the overall vote. The second is to 
commend the alternative vote – preferential voting in single-member districts. 
The logic here is that if minorities are present in enough heterogeneous electoral 
districts then larger parties and their candidates will seek to win lower-order 
preferences from minority voters – and thereby moderate tendencies towards 
ethnic, religious or linguistic extremism. This is sometimes called “vote-pooling”. 
This possible outcome, however, is heavily dependent upon the possibility of 
having enough such heterogeneous districts, and forgets that majorities within 
districts can be constructed by extremists as well as by moderates, especially 
when the former can represent the latter as betraying the relevant community. 
Moreover, the alternative vote, because it requires successful candidates to 
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have been counted), makes it very unlikely that small parties will fare well, and 
that means minority parties will be disproportionally under-represented. So, 
even if minorities may get to influence the behavior of the candidates of larger 
parties under the alternative vote, it may well be at the price of achieving the 
separate representation that they might win under proportional representation.  
 
Consociational logic, and the management of multi-national or multi-ethnic 
federations at the center,  point,  by contrast,  to inclusivity and proportional 
representation  as the preferred goal and method of the electoral system. Other 
mechanisms can be used. Communal rolls have been used in consociational and 
semi-consociational systems, e.g. in pre-independence India and Burma, and 
independent Lebanon and Cyprus, but for reasons discussed in  the text these are 
corporate and illiberal in nature. Reserved seats for minorities have been used to 
guarantee minority representation in parliaments in numerous polities, both 
consociational and non-consociational (e.g.  in Croatia for Hungarians, Italians, 
Germans and others, and in Western Samoa, for non-indigenous minority 
peoples). Over-representation of regions in parliaments  may achieve similar 
effects. So may  ‘affirmative gerrymandering’ within winner-takes-all systems - 
where ‘spiders’, ‘lollipops’ and generally contorted districts are drawn to ensure 
e.g. African-American or Latino majority districts in the USA.  Such systems may 
be useful, especially for groups that might otherwise fail to win any elected 
officials; but they may also be condemned as tokenistic ‘set-asides’.  Brendan O'Leary  Page 100  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  100
 
Liberal consociationalists, however,   reject reserved seats (except for very small 
minorities);  and they reject communal rolls of voters (though they object less to 
designated rolls of parliamentarians where the elected officials opt to be part of 
one community). For liberal consociationalists the effective choice is between list 
proportional representation systems (the formulae that can be used with such  
systems are cited in the main text) and the preferential voting system known as 
the single transferable vote. List proportional representation systems enable 
voters to cast one vote for a party that has presented and ranked-ordered its list 
of candidates. The number of candidates elected is determined by the party’s 
share of the vote, the formula used (see above),  and the district magnitude (the 
number of seats to be filled). These systems enable voters to choose that party  
with which they identify. They may pick a national, ethnic, religious or linguistic 
party, or not,  the choice is theirs. Such systems  normally enable party leaders to 
have control over the rank-order of candidates on the list (though open-list 
systems are also possible), and they are sometimes defended because they fortify 
the autonomy of political leaders willing to sustain a politics of cross-community 
accommodation. By contrast,  preferential proportional representation enables 
voters to vote for either party or individual candidates, and to express 
preferences in numerical order across both parties and candidates. This system 
prevents voters from ‘wasting’ their votes  - if they express first-preference 
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their lower-order preferences are likely to count in determining which 
candidates reach the quotas required for election to office. This system has the 
advantage of enabling voters to reward the moderate candidates or moderate 
parties from other communities by giving them lower-order transfers on their 
ballot-papers. It enables both ‘proportionality’ and ‘vote-pooling’. 
 
No political scientist would claim that electoral systems on their own can achieve 
successful “inclusion”, especially of minorities, but all would insist that an 
inappropriate electoral system may well be deeply damaging for the prospects of 
assimilation, integration, national federation, multi-national federation or 
consociation.  Brendan O'Leary  Page 102  first vs. Oct 03,  corrected vs. 7/12/2004  102
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